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The thesis investigates factors which determine the choice of the search method used 
by the unemployed in looking for jobs. In line with the existing literature on job 
search in South Africa we identify that job search is constrained by the low 
probability of finding a job and the cost of job search. Especially in the context of 
mass unemployment, job seekers have to evaluate the benefits and costs of job search. 
It has been suggested that as a response to adverse conditions of the labour market, 
the use of social networks is an important search strategy in getting access to the 
labour market. This thesis therefore pays especially attention to social networks. We 
develop a more formal search model to establish how certain factors can either 
constrain or facilitate the search process. We argue that search strategy is determined 
by the probability of locating a job, the probability of getting a job, the financial cost 
of the search method as well as the opportunity cost of pursuing the search method. 
This helps us to identify individual, household and labour market characteristics 
which affect the choice of the search method. Using the first wave of the 
KhayelitshaJMitchell's Plain Survey, our findings support the argument that the 
choice of the search strategy is a compromise between what the job searchers perceive 
to be the most effective search strategy and what is feasible for them. Especially job 
searchers which rely exclusively on active or passive search strategies have indicated 
that they perceive other search methods as more effective, which shows that they are 
constrained in the pursuit of such methods. The findings of the descriptive and 
econometric analysis show that the use of social networks is strongly dependent on 
the number of contacts the searcher has got in the labour market. This confirms the 
claim that the usefulness of social networks is dependent on the position of the 
searcher in network structures. The closer the job searcher is to the recruitment 
network of the labour market the more effective is the pursuit of passive search. The 
main constraint to active search is the lack of time available for search. When job-
seekers are not time constrained and also reported to have contacts in the labour 
market they immediately pursue a mixed search strategy of active and passive 
methods. Surprisingly, personal characteristics of the searchers explain very little of 
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A recent study by the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) (2004) shows that 
by 2002 South Africa's unemployment problem had increased in its severity to a strict 
unemployment rate of higher than 30% and a broad unemployment rate of close to 
42%. A constant question that unemployed job-seekers have to ask themselves is 
"how do I get a job?" High unemployment rates force unemployed workers to 
carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of job search itself and the search 
method they pursue. 
The KhayelitshalMitchell' s Plain Survey (2000) shows that close to two thirds of the 
currently employed in this area found their jobs through social networks. Thus, they 
found employment because friends or relatives told them about a job or even 
organised a job for them at the contact's workplace. The remaining one third got 
employed through more formal channels like newspaper advertisements or through 
other active methods like contacting employers directly. The unemployed job-seekers 
in Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain exhibited search behaviour which seemed to be 
consistent with the way in which the currently employed found employment. Slightly 
more than one third of the job-seekers used active search methods exclusively, while 
the remaining searchers either exclusively relied on social networks or pursued a 
mixed strategy of active methods and social networks. 
The question is what determines the choice of the search method of the unemployed? 
Is it solely influenced by the success of other employed people or is the choice of the 
search method determined by a combination of factors? It is argued in this paper that 
the unemployed pursue search methods that are a compromise between what they 
perceive to be an effective way for them to search for a job and what is feasible for 
them. Individual and household characteristics as well as labour market conditions 
either facilitate or constrain the pursuit of certain search methods. 
The aim of this thesis is therefore twofold. Firstly, we try to add to the conceptual 
understanding of job search by developing a search model that explains the various 
factors influencing the decision of the unemployed to look for a job with a particular 
search method. Secondly, using the KMP survey, we investigate factors which 
determine the search behaviour of unemployed residents in the Mitchell's Plain 
magistrate. Given the significance of social networks in determining labour market 
outcomes, the emphasis of the analysis lies on social networks. 
The thesis is structured in the following way. The second chapter provides an 
overview of the existing literature on job search in South Africa. The ongoing debate 
around the most appropriate definition of unemployment in the South African context 
highlights the need for further investigation into the search behaviour of the 
unemployed. It is generally agreed that obstacles in getting access to relevant labour 
market information determine the search behaviour of the unemployed. High search 
costs and a low probability of finding a job reduce search activity. The importance of 












The third chapter establishes the theoretical underpinnings of job search. Job search 
and the choice of the search method are dependent on the probability of finding a job 
and the costs of search. We show that the probability of finding a job is strongly 
influenced by having access to relevant market information (the probability of 
locating a job) and the ability to communicate private information to the employer 
(the probability of getting the job that has been found). Hence, the more and the better 
the information transmission between the employer and the job-seeker, the higher is 
the probability of employment and the more effective is the search method. At the 
same time various constraints based on the job searcher's individual characteristics as 
well as his or her household characteristics might hinder the job-seeker in pursuing 
the search method which he or she perceives to be most effective. Thus, the choice of 
the search method is a compromise between what is perceived to be most effective 
and what is feasible. 
The fourth chapter develops an argument which shows that two types of networks 
seem to constitute the search process in the labour market. From the demand side, 
employers are using 'recruitment networks' to fill open vacancies whereby they rely 
on their existing workforce to find and recommend applicants, while on the supply 
side the unemployed job-seekers might choose networks as their main search method 
to look for available jobs. Although these two networks eventually overlap, members 
of each network can have different characteristics, which can determine the outcome 
of the search process for the searching individual. It is argued here that the position of 
the searching individual in the structure of the two social networks will determine the 
ability to take advantage of the networks and therefore the success of getting 
employed. 
Chapter 5 introduces the KhayelitshaiMitchell's Plain survey. We use the survey to 
analyse factors which constrain or facilitate the pursuit of certain search strategies. 











2. Unemployment and Job Search in South Africa 
There has been extensive debate in South Africa about which definition of the 
unemployment rate most appropriately represents the nature of unemployment in 
South Africa (Kingdon and Knight 2000, Dinkelman and Pirouz 2001, Nattrass 2002). 
Scholars mainly disagree about which the factors influence the level of participation 
of jobless people in the labour market. 
2.1 The Definition of Unemployment 
The demand for labour constitutes the amount of workers required by producers to 
generate an output of goods and services. The supply of labour is seen as the number 
of people who are willing and able to provide their services to those producers and 
therefore are actively "engage[ d] in or seeking paid employment" (Sapsford & 
Tzannatos, 1993: 7). The labour force is then derived from the sum of the employed 
workers and those seeking work. The jobless people who are seeking work are 
defined as unemployed. As the unemployment rate is the percentage of jobless people 
seeking work relative to the entire labour force, the definition of unemployment 
directly affects the unemployment rate. The more jobless people are excluded from 
the unemployment definition, the lower is the unemployment rate and vice versa. The 
question therefore is what job seeking activity indicates the participation of a jobless 
person in the labour market, i.e. when does an unemployed individual indicate 
willingness to be available for work? 
To investigate the level of participation, surveys conventionally are based on the 
'activity principle' meaning "a person's labour market status is determined by what he 
or she was actually doing during a specified (short) period prior to the survey 
interview" (Nattrass, 2002: 3). Based on their activity, people are then categorised as 
employed, unemployed or non-participating. 
Unemployment refers to people who are not working for some kind of financial 
compensation but are: a) willing to work; b) available for work; and c) actively 
searching for work. (Statistics SA, 2002) 
The fulfilment of conditions a, b and c defines a 'narrow' or 'strict' definition of 
unemployment where the jobless person not only has to be willing and available for 
work but must also have been actively searching for a job in a given time period. l A 
'broad' or 'expanded' definition of unemployment requires the fulfilment of 
conditions a and b, but does not require condition c. Hence, to be categorized as 
broadly unemployed a jobless person only has to be willing and available for work 
without having done any active search for a job in the reference period prior to the 
survey. 
In South Africa the debate around the most appropriate definition of unemployment 
was sparked with the decision of Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) in 1998 to adopt 
the narrow definition as the 'official' definition of unemployment. This represented a 
move away from StatsSA's decision of 1993, when it opted for the use of the broad 











definition of unemployment. StatsSA justified its decision by referring to higher 
international compatibility of the narrow definition, which apparently is used by the 
majority of all countries. Furthermore, the narrow definition is considered to be more 
accurate in following the unemployment trend as the broad definition would bring 
"more subjectivity into the measure of the unemployment rate, and instability in 
tracking trends, as it is more difficult in establishing what constitutes 'wanting' a job 
than to say whether someone has engaged in definite actions to find one" (Statistics 
SA, 1998: 63). 
This means that active job search itself is seen as the only indicator of willingness. It 
therefore divides jobless people on the one side into narrowly defined unemployed 
who indicate their willingness to participate in the labour market through search and 
on the other side into non-participants who might want work but seem to do nothing 
to find a job. Participation of the unemployed in the labour market is therefore simply 
based on the dichotomy between searching and non-searching. 
Table 1: Unemployment rates in South Africa, 1994-2002 (%) 
I Source I Broad 
_M_ 
I Year Narrow 1 Difference 
i OHS 
i Definition Definition 
• 
1994 131.5 20.0 11.5 
1995 OHS 29.2 16.9 12.3 
1 1996 OHS 35.6 21.0 14.6 
l!2?~ i OHS ! 37.6 22.9 14.7 
. 1998 OHS 38.6 .25.2 13.4 
1999 OHS 36.2 23.3 12.9 
.2000 LFS 35.9 25.8 10.1 
i 2001 LFS 41.6 .29.5 1 12.1 
2002 LFS 41.8 30.5 i 11.3 
Source: October Household Survey (OHS) figures from StatsSA, Labour Force Survey (LFS September Survey) calculatIOns 
from DPRU (2004) 
Table 1 shows the narrow and broad unemployment rate of South Africa since the 
first democratic elections. The most striking insight we can draw from the table is the 
magnitude of the unemployment problem. While only every fifth worker of the 
strictly defined labour force was considered unemployed in 1994, by 2002 this had 
increased to almost every third worker of the strict labour force being unemployed. In 
terms of the broadly unemployed, the broad unemployment rate has increased from 
30.5% to more than 40% of the labour force being unemployed but actually willing to 
work. 
Two questions arise out of this picture. Firstly, why is the unemployment rate so 
high? Secondly, given the significant difference between the narrow and the broad 
rate of unemployment in South Africa why are there so many jobless people who 
indicate that they are willing to work and that they are available for work but do not 














Although the first question is not the focus of this thesis, it needs to be addressed 
briefly for an understanding ofthe implications ofthe second question. As Wittenberg 
puts it, "the simplest labour market models would assume that [South Africa's high 
unemployment rate] is purely a pricing issue: that either reservation wages of the 
unemployed are too high (in which case the unemployment is of the voluntary type), 
or that the wage is not at the market clearing level, due to various distortions in the 
South African economy"(Wittenberg, 2001: 1). 
But Walker (2003) disagrees with the voluntary unemployment argument by showing 
that the reservation wages of the unemployed are below the predicted wages of the 
employed with similar characteristics. Using data of the 2000 KhayelitshalMitchell's 
Plain Survey, his findings indicate that the labour market status, i.e. being employed 
or unemployed, is not determined by the reservation wage but rather that the 
reservation wage is a function of the labour market status. He concludes that "there is 
no evidence that the unemployed are out of work due to excessive wage aspirations, 
in relation to the wage they could command in employment". Moreover, the 
reservation wage falls continuously with the length of unemployment indicating that 
"people are responding rationally to the adverse labour market conditions"(Ibid: 52-
53). 
If the reservation wage analysis is limited in explaining South Africa's unemployment 
problem, what factors determine the level of participation of the South African 
unemployed to engage in the labour market? Walker suggests that "in a country where 
unemployment is low, and where there are a sufficient number of job vacancies, 
knowing the determinants of reservation wages may be useful for explaining whether 
relatively high reservation wages are reducing the supply of labour. However, in 
South Africa the problem in the labour market is rather inadequate demand for 
unskilled labour"(Ibid: 52). This is supported by the study of the DPRU (2004) which 
claims that the high unemployment rate is due to "slow employment growth relative 
to labour force growth"(DPRU, 2004: 3). 
2.2 Unemployment Search in South Africa 
Considering that the reservation wage analysis fails to account for the high 
unemployment rate with market wages exceeding reservation wages, one has to 
rethink the factors that influence job search. Various studies in South Africa have 
started to shed light on the search behaviour of the unemployed and have thereby 
contributed greatly to the unemployment definition debate. These studies have been 
guided by the idea that job search is not frictionless and costless and that individuals 
do not operate purely on market signals but rather through non-market interactions. 
(Wittenberg, 2001). The decision therefore to engage in search is dependent on the 
probability of finding a job and the cost of search. 
The majority of the unemployed show the following characteristics. Unemployment 
runs mainly along racial, gender, spatial, age and educational lines. More Africans 
than any other racial group are unemployed, more females than men, more younger 
people than older, more rural than urban living, and finally, the unemployed are on 











approximately 62% are females and over 90% are African. Only one third of them 
are older than 35 years of age and although the majority of the non-searching have 
poor educational background, only 7% had no education while more than 60% had 
more than primary education. Finally, the majority of the non-searching unemployed 
live in rural households. (DPRU, 2004). Given these characteristics, what factors 
influence the search behaviour of the unemployed? 
Kingdon and Knight (2000) analyse whether the non-searching unemployed are 
distinctly different from the searching unemployed. As most non searching 
unemployed live in low income households they argue that non search is not the 
outcome of "high income households supporting their poorer members according to 
need [which creates an ] incentive to remain needy and a disincentive to do job-
search"(Kingdon and Knight, 2000: 1). Non-search is rather the outcome of 
discouragement as "job-search is hampered by impediments such as poverty, cost of 
search, long duration of unemployment, and adverse local economic conditions" 
(Ibid: 1-2). 
Furthermore, recruitment methods of employers and the consequent job search 
methods adopted by the unemployed might explain the lack of active search. "A good 
deal of unskilled labour recruitment in South Africa has traditionally been via 
employers arriving in the rural areas by truck to recruit people on the spot. The main 
way for Africans living in the former 'homeland' areas to secure employment is to 
wait, either for word of a job from an employed relative or friend living in the non-
homeland parts or for recruiters to visit. Accordingly, job search may be passive 
rather than active" (lbid:5). 
Kingdon and Knight conclude "that persons least likely to search are those in poverty 
(who are unable to fund job search), those living in high unemployment areas (who 
have become discouraged), and those living in remote areas (for whom the cost of job 
search is high)"(lbid: 9). Based on their findings they propose the adoption of the 
broad definition of unemployment as this would give a more precise picture of South 
Africa's labour force participation. 
Wittenberg (1999) analyzes job search in South Africa in an era of mass 
unemployment. With the use of a simple search model he shows how the probability 
of finding a job and the cost of search determine if the individual will engage in job 
search. Considering that rural areas have the lowest number of job opportunities and 
that search cost in terms of travelling would be high, he is not surprised that search is 
spatially organized. We therefore see "higher levels of search activity and higher 
levels of employment in the urban areas and higher levels of not economically active 
people in the rural areas"(Wittenberg, 1999: 41). He furthermore suggests that 
employment success is influenced by informal networks. Firstly, matric qualifications 
are "highly variable between individuals" which has reduced the signalling function 
of educational attainment and secondly, "in a situation in which large numbers of the 
unemployed all posses the matric, its utility as a potential sorting device for an 
employer is reduced"(lbid: 32). The outcome is that education matters little in the 
employment process and that employers therefore increasingly rely on informal 
networks to source workers. Standing, Sender and Weeks (1996) report that close to 
42% of firms "relied on friends and relatives of existing workers" to recruit new 











ties to the labour market through an employed household member, "reduce search 
costs and [generate] a higher probability of [employment] success"(Wittenberg, 1999: 
41). 
Dinkelman and Pirouz (200 1) accept the search-constraint argument as the basis of 
their paper and claim that the simplistic dichotomy of search versus non· search is 
misleading. They argue that because of constraints imposed on the unemployed to 
participate in the labour market, the South African labour force has to be studied 
according to "several degrees of labour force attachments" (Dinkelman & Priouz, 
2001: 4). Attachment is described as a continuum of "the degree of active 
participation by the jobless in the labour market in terms of search activity and 
willingness to work" (Ibid: 8). These degrees of labour force attachment are 
represented on a scale in terms of search intensity. 















Search intensity is a combination of the search method and the access to market 
information, which the search method facilitates. Access to relevant market 
information increases the attachment of the individual. Normally, active search 
methods should yield the highest degree of attachment, but "in an environment of 
mass unemployment, non-searchers with contacts within the labour force may even 
have a closer attachment to the labour market than some actively searching individual, 
because of the information channel, which is presumably opened up by the labour 
market contact" (Ibid: 9). 
Using data from the OHS 1997 Dinkelman and Pirouz analyze individual, household 
and community level characteristics which explain a person's degree of labour market 
attachment. Their results show that the weakest labour force attachment is 











They suggest that this pattern of labour market attachment can be explained by the 
access to market information. 
"The net benefits of search are likely to be low when individuals are 
not able to access the correct type or quality of labour market 
information to ensure successful search. Information barriers in the 
labour market are generated through the individual characteristics of 
an unemployed person, as well as household and community or 
regional characteristics. For example: in South Africa, the costs of 
search facing a second-language English speaker living in rural 
Kwazulu-Natal in a household with no access to a telephone or 
regular newspapers, and with no other employed relatives are 
presumably very high. Add to this the reduced probability of this 
individual finding a job without matric or tertiary qualification and 
with no prior work experience, then the choice of non-search or the 
onset of discouragement may indeed be rational"(lbid:8). 
More recent papers have increasingly concentrated on the impact of different 
household characteristics on the success of search. Dinkelman (2004) investigates 
transition rates of unemployed searchers into employment using the 1993 Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development and the 1998 Kwazulu-Natal [ncome 
Dynamics Study. Besides individual characteristics she identifies four possible ways 
in which the household impacts on the search success. Households function as private 
security nets, productive units, information networks, and as creators of a work and/or 
search culture. 
When the household functions as a private security net unemployed members of the 
household are financially supported which can decrease the search activity of the 
unemployed member. This is confirmed for the male unemployed whose search 
success probability falls with an increase in the number of pensioners in the 
household. For the female unemployed the employment probability falls with the 
existence of a male pensioner but rises with the existence of a female pensioner which 
suggests that female search behaviour is also determined by their roles in the 
household. This refers to the second function of the household. When households 
function as productive units different members of the household have particular duties 
to fulfil. Thus, less domestic duties in terms of child care or the existence of other 
people who can fulfil this role like a female pensioner increase the probability of 
females to participate in the labour market. Dinkelman's results indicate that an 
increasing household size decreases the search success probability of females as a 
bigger household can be associated with more housework. 
A household can also reduce search cost as well as increase the probability of finding 
a job. It can be a "privileged source of information for the unemployed, if it contains 
existing labour market links"(Dinkelman, 2004: 515). Her results though are 
inconclusive as it depends on the net effect of increasing the private security net 
function of the household and increasing access to labour market information. While 
the former reduces the search success probability, the latter should increase it. Finally, 
she finds that large part of the residual accounts for unmeasured household effects. 











information, or from the culture of the household, or some combination of the 
two"(lbid: 516). 
Wittenberg (2001) using 1995 October Household Survey data pursues a similar 
objective by analysing the impact of household and neighbourhood effects on the 
probability of finding employment. He argues that the employment probability is 
strongly influenced by the structure of the household. It "impacts on all the variables 
involved in the decision: the value of finding a job, the cost of searching as well as the 
value of non-market activities"(Wittenberg, 2001: 5) He suggests that "individuals 
who do engage in search from households where there is already someone employed 
have an advantage in finding employment"(Ibid: 6). 
Furthermore, entire neighbourhoods can influence the partIclpation behaviour of 
individuals. The behaviour and expectations of households and commumtIes 
(neighbourhoods) can create a culture when "there is a history of working, individuals 
are expected to show effort in finding employment, while perhaps in communities 
where there is a more patchy history of work, it is not anticipated that job search will 
be successful, so effort is 10wer"(Ibid: 6). 
He finds that household employment matters in increasing the probability of finding a 
job. This though is more significant for rural households than in urban. The findings 
also seem to indicate the existence of social roles in terms of domestic duties. More 
children as well as old men have a negative effect on the probability of females 
finding employment which suggest that females have to look after the young and the 
sickly. This confirms Woolard and Leibbrandt's claim (1999) that the time for 
females to participate in the labour market is severely restricted through household 
activities. According to the Participatory Poverty Assessment "women are often 
singly responsible for child-care, cleaning the house, fetching and heating water, 
washing and ironing, shopping, collecting firewood, cooking and washing dishes" 
(Woolard and Leibbrandt, 1999: 23). 
Wittenberg concludes his findings with the suggestion that "if some households have 
better information or are better able to signal their quality to an employer, then the 
costs of making a successful match is reduced. This would lead to much higher 
probabilities of finding work"(Wittenberg, 2001: 14). 
Duff and Fryer (2004) present a preliminary analysis of job search actlvitIes in 
Duncan village, a pre-urban township close to East London. They focus on factors 
which determine the choice of the search method. For them 'job search is the external 
labour market, in the sense that it defines the way in which employees and employers 
locate each other, and, as such, it is one of the most important factors determining the 
information structure of the labour market"(Duff & Fryer, 2004: 2). 
They distinguish between three forms of search: formal search (newspapers and/or 
employment agencies); word-of-mouth (assistance from relatives and friends, i.e. 
social networks); and place-to-place (direct contact of job searchers by going to 
factories and/or knocking on doors). The breakdown along these search categories is 
according to the search method's ability to transmit information. Formal search is 
possible if all relevant information about the job and the job-seeker can be transmitted 











When job-seekers are "unable to provide employers with a credible signal of their 
quality"(Ibid: 6), they have to rely on social networks to get access to the labour 
market with the help of referrals of friends and relatives. Finally, job-seekers will 
have to use place-to-pace search when they have no access to formal search or social 
networks. 
Place-to-place is the most used search method while word-of-mouth is the least used 
method, but the most successful, as most currently employed found their jobs through 
social networks. For them this suggests "that [networks and formal search] give better 
access to the labour market"(Ibid: 11). Their findings support their argument. 
Network searchers are least educated with slightly less years of education than the 
place-to-place searchers while formal searchers are the most educated. Nevertheless, 
the probability of finding employment is the highest for network searchers and the 
lowest for place-to-place searchers. Networks and formal search methods are used by 
more or less the same amount of unemployed men and women while more men travel 
from place to place. In terms of wages, workers employed through formal methods 
receive the highest wages which are close to their evaluation of their market value. 
Wages of network employed workers and place-to-place employed workers are 
significantly lower than wages of formal method employed workers. Also their 
current wages are significantly below their evaluation of their own market value. 
Finally, on average, network searchers have been searching for the least time of all 
unemployed. 
The authors are surprised that despite the obvious success rate of social networks the 
search method itself is under utilized by both men and women. They conclude that 
people do not choose different search methods. "If a searcher can generate a signal 
which employers trust using formal methods, that searcher will do so. If they cannot 
generate signals they use social networks, which are by nature exclusive, but are also 
by nature likely to provide a very limited set of information about jobs"(lbid: 16). 
To summarize the findings of the existing literature on search in South Africa, there is 
a growing consensus that search is determined by the conditions the job-seeker faces 
which either constrain or facilitate access to information in the labour market 
characterised by mass unemployment. The job-seeker has to gather information about 
vacancies and be able to signal his or her qualifications to the employer. Both these 
problems can be solved with various search methods which yield different success 
rates in fulfilling these functions. The cost of pursuing the search method in terms of 
financial costs and other opportunities forgone further constrain the ability of the 
searcher to actively search. The literature therefore suggests that in these 
circumstances the use of informal information networks is a highly successful search 
method. Having contacts with employed friends and relatives increases the probability 
of finding a job significantly while it reduces the cost of search. 
The main limitation of the existing literature on job search in South Africa has been 
the inadequacy of the survey data to investigate factors which influence the decision 
to search. In particular, the breakdown of active search methods and passive search 
methods is problematic. For example, the OHS survey design can lead to an under 
sampling of network searchers. "The question about the method of job-search comes 
after the question about whether a person did any job search in the past week!4weeks. 











people waiting for recruitment lorries to arrive) would not know whether such waiting 
would constitute a valid form of job search in the eyes of the enumerator, they may 
well say 'no' to the question asking whether they engaged in any job-search in the 
relevant period"(Kingdon and Knight, 2000: 5). The problem is that this question is a 
'hurdle' question, thus, respondents who said 'no' are not asked about their 'actual' 
search activities. This would explain why Dinkelman and Pirouz (2001) have a very 
low percentage of social network searchers while queuing at a workplace is reported 
as the dominant search method. 
A further problem is the fact that most labour force surveys do not ask the employed 
how they got their jobs. Thus, while Wittenberg (2001) can show a significant 
correlation between the probability of finding employment and the existence of an 
employed member in the household, he cannot show that the employed household 
member actually functioned as an information transmitter, i.e. that household 
employment leads to employment through social networks. The data simply does not 
allow this kind of investigation. 
In addition, Wittenberg'S studies (1999, 2001) as well as Dinkelman and Pirouz 
(2001) and Dinkelman (2004) focus on transition states of unemployed people into 
employment. While we can draw some conclusions about the search behaviour of the 
unemployed, their studies focus on factors which lead to successful search. Of these 
studies only Dinkelman (2004) used panel data to analyse transition states, i.e. she 
traced the success of the searching unemployed over time. 
Finally, only Duff and Fryer's study (2004) investigates factors which determine the 
choice of the search method. Most studies do not concern themselves with the details 
of the ways in which the unemployed actually look for a job and which factors 
influenced their choices. Duff and Fryer's study (2004) is so far the only explanation 
for the pursuit of different search methods in South Africa. 
Following the findings of the above studies, the present thesis focuses on factors that 
determine the choice of the search method and in particular the decision to use social 
networks. To identify possible factors that determine the choice of the search method 
we have to establish a theoretical framework which explains the decision to search 
and the choice of the search method. Secondly, we use the 2000 KayelitshaiMitchell's 
Plain (KMP) survey to analyse factors which characterise groups who use different 
search methods. The design of the KMP survey proves very useful. Employed 
workers were asked how they got their current job, and unemployed workers were 
asked to report all search methods they use to look for a job. Neither group had to 











3. Job Search: A Theoretical Framework 
The unemployed individual has to decide how to organize his or her search activity to 
yield the best results in terms of the probability of finding employment. Various 
factors which either constrain or facilitate the job-seeker's search activity force the 
job-seeker to choose a search strategy which enables him or her to participate in the 
labour market 
The following model is a 'partial' equilibrium model as we only focus on the supply 
side of the labour market2• This thesis tries to identify factors which constrain or 
facilitate effective participation of job-seekers in the labour market. Demand side 
factors of the employer are taken into account as influences on the behaviour of the 
job-seeker. However, we do not know which variables affect the employer's decision 
during the recruitment process. Therefore we do not attempt to explain the factors 
which determine the success of search methods in finding employment. 
3.1 The Classical Labour Market and Participation 
The simple labour market model referred to by Wittenberg (200 1) perceives the 
unemployed as atomistic individuals who simply have to choose between working 
and consuming leisure. This basic model of the 'work-leisure' decision would argue 
that an "individual, having a fixed amount of time available, must decide how that 
time should be allocated among work ('labour market activity') and leisure ('non-
labour market activity')" (McConnell, Brue & Macpherson, 1999: 15). This decision 
would be derived from a utility maximizing function which takes the individual's 
preferences and his or her budget constraint into account. The individual's willingness 
to work is hence dependent on his or her taste, i.e. his or her preference between on 
the one hand consuming leisure as well as home made goods and on the other hand 
market produced goods, which he can only buy with money from an income i.e. his or 
her market earnings. 3 
The decision to participate in the labour market is reflected in a reservation wage 
which would allow the individual to be compensated for forgone leisure. This 
compensation would allow the individual to consume market goods instead. This 
relationship is shown in diagram 1. 
2 Recent matching models developed by Pissaridis (2000) and Calvo-Armengol (2003) show factors 
which influence the supply side as well as the demand side during the matching process. In this paper, 
our focus lies on factors which influence the supply of labour in terms of search activity. 


















Hours of leisure 
Source adapted from McConnell cl al (1999) 
Leisure can be expressed as the value of unemployment: 
= 
Value of Unemployment 
Ai non-market + Incnon wage 
24h 
[eq. 1] 
where Uj is the value of unemployment of individual i and Ai non-market is the individual 
i's value of non·market activity and Incnon wage shows all income sources of individual 
i other than wages4• 
Once the wage is equal or marginally greater than the value of unemployment, the 
individual has an incentive to supply his or her labour to the market and accept the job 
offer. Thus, when w> Ui the individual will change his or her employment status. 
"The optimal work-leisure position is achieved where MRS [of labour for income] is 
equal to the wage rate", simply "where the individual and the market are in agreement 
as to the relative worth of leisure and real income at the margin" (McConnell, Brue & 
Macpherson, 1999: 22). 
The underlying assumption of this model is that all agents are homogenous and have 
perfect information about the job market. From the supply side this leads to the 
acceptance of the job offer being simultaneously the decision to participate by 
entering the market. The individual knows where and when the given wage is equal or 
just marginally above his or her value of unemployment. He or she can then 
immediately pick up any job which will give him or her the reservation wage. From 
4 For the time being we assume that there is no household income through other household members as 











the demand side the homogeneity of the workforce and perfect information lead to a 
frictionless employment procedure with no risk. 
Diagram 2: Neoclassical Labour Market Model 
Wage Unemployment 
w* 
Quantity of labour 
In a world with perfect information, everyone would know what they want and how to 
get it. Perfect information about what is available, where it is available and how to 
obtain it would result in everyone's daily actions instantly optimising whatever they 
want to achieve. In the case of the labour market this would translate to "the notion of 
an auction market in which workers are openly and continuously competing for jobs 
and, conversely, firms persistently bid to attract and retain labour services" (Ibid: 
495). The result would be an equilibrium condition in the labour market as sho\\:TI in 
diagram 2 with full employment level N L and market clearing wage rate w* . 
Given the design of this model there exist only two labour market statuses: employed 
and not participating. The moment the wage is equal or marginally exceeds the 
reservation wage, a non-participant will change into employment. Unemployment 
therefore is voluntary. WI in diagram 2 for example would indicate voluntary 
unemployment as the reservation wage exceeds the market clearing wage. 
3.2 Institutional Views of the Labour Market and Participation 
Unfortunately, the neoclassical idea of the perfectly competitive labour market 
adjusting frictionlessly to full employment level via the price adjustment mechanism 
does not seem to hold very well in the real world. The individual's decision to 
participate cannot simply be reduced to the prevailing market wage. As Wittenberg 
(2001) mentiones, job search is plagued by information imperfections and uncertainty. 
Furthermore, individuals do not live in a vacuum but rather are a part of a social 











Although the utility maximization principle is clearly driving the individual's decision 
to participate in the labour market and wages do function as signals of demand and 
supply, various other factors will influence the behaviour of the job-seeker as well as 
that of the employer. Informed by an institutional economics perspective "the 
behaviour of the individual can only be analysed within an institutional 
context"(Himmelweit, Simonetti & Trigg, 2001: 14). Therefore, one has to take il1to 
account the existence of transaction costs caused by imperfect information and the 
impact of social governance structures. Such structures can determine the relationship 
between the individual and other members of society in terms of norms, rules and 
customs as well as the individual's access to resources. 
3.2.1 Search Unemployment with Imperfect Information 
The question thus is what happens to the decision process when people do not know 
where and when the going wage is equal to their reservation wage? How do they 
decide to participate in the labour market? 
Most times people cannot rely on perfect information to guide their actions. Hence, to 
match what people want and what is available implies obtaining relevant information 
and search costs. "A key problem in achieving effective coordination and adaptation 
is that the information needed to determine the best use of resources and the 
appropriate adaptations is not freely available to everyone ... No single person in 
society has all or even a significant fraction of the needed information. Instead, 
information is localized and dispersed throughout the economy"( Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992: 26). 
The idea of investigating the impact of search costs on the ability of markets to clear 
has only been incorporated to the study of economics in the last 30 to 40 years5. 
Markets characterized by imperfect information require that the market participants 
engage in the gathering and acquisition of relevant market information in order to 
make informed decisions. 
The labour market is no exception. According to Pissaridis: 
"Trade in the labour market is a nontrivial economic activity because 
of the existence of heterogeneities, frictions, and information 
imperfections. If all workers were identical to each other and if all 
jobs were also identical to each other, and if there was perfect 
information about their location, trade would be trivial. But without 
homogeneity on either side of the market and with costly acquisition 
of information, firms and workers find it necessary to spend 
resources to find productive job matches. The heterogeneities may 
be in the skills possessed by workers, on the one hand, and those 
required by firms, on the other. They may be in the information 
possessed about the job. Or, they may be in the location of jobs, and 
workers and in the timing of job creation in different locations. In 











this environment there is uncertainty about the arrival of good jobs to 
job-seekers and good workers to hiring finns, and finns and workers 
have to decide whether to accept what is available, wait for a better 
alternative, or influence the arrival process itself by spending 
resources on the acquisition of infonnation, retaining employees, or 
changing 10cation"(Pissaridis, 2000: 3-4). 
The consequence is that higher search effort increases the probability of finding a job. 
But at the same time, more search leads to higher search costs. "A worker will search 
for wage offers until the expected marginal return equals the marginal cost of search" 
(Stigler, 1962: 96). 
The expected value of search unemployment is specified as: 
expected value of search unemployment 
Pi*(E[WiD + Vi C(s) 
where Pi refers to the individual's probability of finding a job multiplied by the 
expected wage E[wiJ, while Vj refers to the individual's value of unemployment 
and C(s) to the costs of search. What the equation also shows is that the unemployed 
will start searching when Pi*(E[ Wi]) > C( s). 
3.2.2 Search Unemployment within Social Structures 
To fully understand the individual's search behaviour we have to include the social 
structure which on the one hand influences the individual's access to resources while 
on the other hand constrains his or her freedom to choose indefendently as an 
individual because of his or her embeddedness in the social group . This is in line 
with Dinkelman's (2004) discussion of household effects on search behaviour. 
Following Becker8, when an individual is a member of a household, his or her 
participation in the labour market might be influenced by his or her interaction with 
other household members, i.e. the 'role' within the social structure. By being a 
member of a group, where his or her actions have a direct impact on the welfare of the 
group as a whole, the individual's decision will be influenced by his productivity in 
non-market activities and his or her access to income accumulated by the total 
household (Sapsford & Tzannatos, 1993): 11. Going back to our original value 
function of unemployment this extends eq.1 to: 
Vi = [1 + lI(Ahh non-market A j non-market)] * Ai non-market + mj*Inchh (eq.3) 
6 Adapted from Walker (2003). 
7 For the purpose of this paper we follow a 'unitary' household model rather than 'non-consensus' 
models of household behaviour. For a discussion of the various models with a South African 
application see, Black P.A. (2004). 











Ahh refers to the value of non-market activity of the entire household. We assume that 
the individual's role in fulfilling household duties i.e., non-market activities, is driven 
by his or her comparative advantage relative to other household members rather than 
a function of custom and tradition. For simplicity, we will refer to the individual's 
non-market activity and his or her comparative advantage in the household 
[1 + l/(Ahh - Ai)]* Ai simply as AiCA. 
InChh is the total income of individual i's household including individual i's non-wage 
income, as well as all income sources of other household members in individual i' s 
household. mi is the share of total household income available to individual i. Given 
the design of the survey and the questions asked, for this thesis it is assumed that all 
household members have equal access to total household income, hence 
mi*Inchh = InChh I size of household. 
The rules and norms governing the relationships between members of the household 
will influence the individual's access to resources, i.e. the total household income, as 
well as the role of the individual in terms of household activities. 9 This also includes 
the "added worker effect" where assigned roles in the household might change. The 
interplay between the total household income and the assigned social roles can change 
if the household experiences an increase in unemployment. Thus, females or 
teenagers who were responsible for household activities might have to enter the 
labour market when the main breadwinner looses his or her joblO. The question should 
also be to what extent search activities are divided among household members. It 
could be that the household assigns the task of search to one household member who 
then shares this information with other unemployed members of the household. 
Wittenberg (2001) and Dinkelman (2004) account for these spill-over effects in their 
analysis through the unmeasured social effects. 
Incorporating the social aspects of household interactions, the expected value of 
search unemployment is affected by two aspects. Firstly, the expected value depends 
on the difference between access to total household income (mj*Inchh) and the 
financial cost of pursuing a search method (Cs ). Higher household income can llIet 
therefore either increase search activity, because it can be used to finance the search 
activity or it could reduce the search activity by raising the reservation wage of the 
unemployed. The impact depends on the net effect of the two. Secondly, engaging in 
search activity directly reduces the time available for other non-market activities. This 
opportunity cost can be expressed in terms of non-market activity forgone: ts * AiCA 
where ts refers to the time spent on the search activity. 
Including equation 3 we can rewrite the expected value of search unemployment in 
equation 2 as: 
Us Pi*(E[wi]) + AiCA - ts*AiCA + (ll1i*Inchh - Cs ) (eq.S) mel 
9 It would be interesting to investigate the impact of traditional roles within the household like gender 
or age roles on the search behaviour. 











An unemployed individual has an incentive to start searching when Us Ui > 0, i.e .. 
when 
Pi*(E[wi]) ts* AiCA - o (eq.6a) 
The same relationship has been identified by Wittenberg (1999). He claims that 
assuming risk neutrality, an unemployed individual would engage in search when: 
P(w)*V(w) > C + Vopp 
Where pew) is the equivalent to Pi and Yew) represents the expected value of 
employment. 
Although we assume that Wittenberg implied with Vopp the cost of other activities 
forgone, the specification in equation 6a shows explicitly how search generates costs 
in terms of financial costs (Cs ) as well as the reduction of time for other non-market mct 
activities. The opportunity cost therefore is not only a function of the quality of the 
non-market activity (AiCA) but also determined by the intensity of search in terms of 
time (ts). 
3.3 The Probability of Finding a Job and Job Search 
Referring back to equation 6a we see that the search value depends on the success of 
finding a job with an expected wage Wi (Pj*(E[ Wi]) and the cost of searching for this 
job (Cs and ts * AiCA). Wittenberg makes an important observation about the mct 
willingness to search when one looks at the inequality in equation 6b. HIt suggests that 
in a period of mass unemployment, i.e., if pew) is sufficiently reduced, we will see 
many individuals ceasing to search" (Wittenberg, 1999: 39). Thus, there is a major 
difference between "someone who is not economically active because Vopp > Y(w)" 
and someone where Yew) > Yopp but p is small enough that Y(w)*p < Vopp. (Ibid: 
39). This kind of behaviour is described as the discouraged worker effect where the 
probability of finding a job is so small that the unemployed perceives the benefits of 
search not worth the cost of search and therefore ceases to search. 
In most search theory literature the probability of finding a job (Pi) is said to depend 
on the individual's characteristics (e.g., race, age, gender, education level etc), 
macroeconomic climate (especially the existing local unemployment rate), and the 
labour demand of the employers (Walker, 2003). 











We find that the "probability of finding a job" needs to be more thoroughly defined. It 
seems that no distinction is made between the search process and the process of 
getting a job. We argue that locating a job is a prerequisite to getting a job. The 
probability of 'finding a job' therefore is a two-stage process: without locating a 
vacancy, one cannot get a job. Both states are influenced by different factors. 
The search literature in South Africa identifies both processes without explicitly 
separating them. Wittenberg (2001) is the closest to differentiating between the two 
probabilities. He argues that "if some households have better information or are better 
able to signal their quality to an employer, then the cost of making a successful match 
is reduced. This would lead to much higher probabilities of finding 
work"(Wittenberg, 2001: 14). 'Better information' increases the probability of 
locating a job, while 'able to signal their quality' increases the probability of getting a 
job. In this regard, the attachment categories of Dinkelman and Pirouz (2001) are a 
perfect example of factors influencing the probability of locating a job. They define 
attachment to the labour market through the ability of the job-seeker to get 
information about vacancies. Duff and Fryer (2004), on the other hand concentrate in 
their theoretical framework on the probability of getting a job by being able to send a 
reliable signal. In their discussion of the survey data though, they describe both 
processes. More importantly, Duff and Fryer argue that especially social networks 
might have counterproductive effects on the two probabilities. Social networks can 
positively impact on the probability of getting a job by transmitting a reliable signal. 
"However, reliance on social groups of limited size is likely to provide individuals 
with a much smaller set of information"(Duff and Fryer, 2004: 8). Social networks 
therefore can increase the probability of getting a job while at the same time reducing 
the probability of locating a job. This, though, depends on the quality of the network 
as well as the recruitment method of the employer as will be shown later. 
The following is an illustration of the factors influencing the probability of finding a 
job, i.e. the combination of the probability of locating a job and the probability of 
getting a job. 
Locating a job depends on the availability of jobs in the job market which match the 
job-seeker's characteristics. If no company has any matching vacancies the 
probability of locating a job is zero. If all companies have matching vacancies the 
probability of locating a job is 100%. Thus, let P(vIC i) be the probability of making 
contact with a company which has a vacancy that matches the characteristics of the 
job-seeker 'C j '. We can therefore rewrite the probability of finding a job Pi simply as 
the probability of locating a job P(y) = P(vIC i). This probability is dependent on the 
number of vacancies and the unemployment rate. 
Knowing which company has vacancies and which company has no vacancies 
increases the probability of contacting companies with vacancies. To simplify one 
could say that P(y) = kn * P(v\CJ), where k is a constant and n > O. An increase in 
information is represented in an increase in n. If n = 0, there is no information to 
distinguish between companies that have matching jobs and companies that do not 
have matching jobs, the probability of locating a job is simply determined by the 
number of companies with matching vacancies relative to companies with no 
matching vacancies P(vIC). The more one knows about companies that have 











Therefore, as n increases so does the probability of locating a job. "n" itself is a 
function of search intensity: n f(Sint) which is, as described above, simply the search 
method (Smet) and the time spent on searching (ts). Assuming for simplicity that there 
is a linear relationship, the search intensity is simply the time spent pursuing the 
chosen search method: Sint ts*Smet. Thus, the probability of locating a job P(y) can 
be expressed as: 
(eq.7) 
The probability of locating a job is a representation of Dinkelman and Pirouz' s labour 
market attachment categories. More time spent searching should yield more 
information while different search methods allow unequal access to information. 
Once one has located a vacancy, various other factors will determine if one gets the 
job. Here your individual 'job getting' characteristics13 will affect your probability of 
getting the job: 
(eq.8) 
where 'emp' refers to getting the job, i.e. being chosen by the employer over other 
applicants. This is conditional on 'qg, which represents the individual i's job getting 
characteristics that make him or her 'different' to other applicants who also fit the 'job 
description'. These characteristics are more related to positive aspects of the 
personality of the applicant like 'hard working' and 'trustworthiness'. The probability 
of getting a job depends on the ability of the applicant to communicate this private 
information to the employer. 
The probability of finding a job then is the product of the probability of locating a job 
P(y) and the probability of getting a job P(z). 
(eq.9) 
12 With no search at all f(Sin!) 0 which leads to k f\S"H) = 1. In this case k f\S"" ) * P( viC) would 
simply be P(vICJ, Once the search intensity is greater than 0, the increase in the infonnation gathered is 
positively increasing the probability ofiocating a job. 
13 It is already assumed that the individual found a job which matches the individual's characteristics. 
This means that all applicants fit the job description and are homogenous. The 'job getting' 
characteristics reflect the individual's advantage in terms of the ability to communicate other 
information like personality traits which will influence the employer 'positively' in favour of the 











Finally, given the breakdown of the probability of finding a job Pi, we can rewrite the 
added value of search function as: 
Cs > o (eq. 10) mel 
3.4 Which Search Method Should One Choose? 
The choice of the search method is dependent on four factors: the ability to locate a 
job, the ability to get the job, the financial cost of pursuing the search method, and the 
opportunity cost of pursuing the search method. 
The choice of the search method and the time spent on pursuing this method 
determine the expected added value of the job search. But which search method 
should the unemployed use? Considering the financial and time constraints of the 
search method (Cs and ts * AicA respectively) as well as the probability of finding a met 
job, the choice of the search method is a compromise between what is perceived to be 
effective and what is feasible. 
The probability of finding a job is dependent on a range of individual, household and 
local labour market characteristics which make the search method 'effective' in the 
eyes of the searcher. A highly skilled IT specialist will not wait on the side of the road 
to be picked up for a computer programmer job. No matter how much time he or she 
will spend pursuing this search method, the expected success to find an appropriate 
job is very small. Similarly an unskilled worker will most probably have a lower 
success rate finding a job through the internet than by walking from factory to factory 
and directly asking for a job. 
Clearly the probability of locating a job is strongly dependent on the recruitment 
process of the employer. If computer programmers were to be picked up on a daily 
basis on the side of the road, this search method would be highly successful compared 
to others. Also, if more companies were to advertise more jobs for unskilled workers 
on the internet, utilizing the internet as a search method would be very effective for 
the unemployed unskilled worker. 
Hence, 'locating a job' is very much the outcome of the labour market's modus 
operandi of how information about vacancies and available workers are 
communicated. Recruitment methods of the employer are dependent on cost benefit 
calculations. Generally, the literature on recruitment methods suggests that "firms 
invest more search effort in filling positions that require more education and training" 
(Osberg, 1993: 351). Companies have an incentive to increase search costs the higher 
the productivity of the desired worker and the lower the number of workers with the 
desired characteristic. Similar to the search of the job-seeker, companies will search 
until the expected marginal return equals the marginal cost of search. Recruitment of 
skilled workers therefore is mostly done through formal channels while unskilled 
workers are hired through cheaper channels with the main search cost imposed onto 











channels, unskilled workers have to rely on informal channels or have to directly 
contact the employer. 
The probability of getting a job is dependent on the ability of the job-seeker to use the 
search method to communicate reliable signals about his ability to the employer. 
When the paper qualification is a sufficient signal, formal methods can transmit the 
information. Formal channels will be inappropriate when the paper qualification is not 
sufficient because of high variability of the signal. This confirms Duff and Fryer's 
argument that job-seekers use the search method which allows them to send a reliable 
signal. At the same time, formal channels can also fail when the job requires 
particular personality characteristics which formal channels cannot communicate. 
"While the formal market is quite good at signalling worker skills -- education, worker 
training programmes, and skill certifications the formal job market is a very poor 
provider of other infornlation desired by employers, such as worker reliability, 
willingness to follow direction, attitude, and trustworthiness"(McEntarfer, 2003: 51). 
In this case informal channels, social networks especially give the job-seeker an 
advantage. The problem is that some methods which increase the probability of 
locating a job and the probability of getting a job are not available or feasible for 
some job-seekers. 
It was already indicated that the time spent pursuing certain search methods reduces 
the time available for other non-market activities. Furthermore, the financial cost of 
pursuing the search method might be so high that the expected benefit from search 
does not cover the cost. At the same time, individual characteristics as well as 
household characteristics might not make certain search options feasible. Health 
problems or physical impediments can hinder the unemployed to actively pursue more 
'appropriate' methods. Lack of formal educational, especially the inability to read and 
write, reduces the ability of thc searcher to gather printed information and to respond 
in writing. 
The effect of household structure on the feasibility of search methods arises out of the 
ability of the rest of the household to facilitate conditions which allow the 
unemployed to search. This includes giving the unemployed access to financial 
resources to finance the search method or to release the unemployed from domestic 
duties in order to have enough time to search. A household can also facilitate search if 
its characteristic is a necessary condition for the search method itself, as is the case 
with social networks. 
Generally, the search literature defines the following methods of job search: 
1) Employment agency (public or private) 
2) Advertisement on internet 
3) Advertisement in newspaper 
4) Advertisement on notice board 
5) Contacted companies or factories directly 
6) Contacted previous employer 
7) Wait on the side of the road 
8) Social networks of friends and family 











Each of the above search methods is characterized by a different probability of 
finding a job, i.e. locating and getting a job, and financial and opportunity cost. 
Following the South African search literature, social networks function as a major 
search method. They impose the least costs with regard to financial and opportunity 
costs while their ability to positively impact on the probability of finding a job is 
dependent on a range of factors. The following chapter therefore establishes factors 











4. Social networks and the labour market 
Given the importance of social networks in the Cape Town labour market as has been 
suggested by the KMP survey data, it is crucial to get a more detailed understanding 
of the functioning of social networks and their impact on labour market outcomes. 
4.1 Theories of Social Networks in Labour Markets 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the choice of the search method is a compromise 
between constraint and effectiveness. While effectiveness is determined by the 
probabilities of locating and getting a job based on the recruitment process of the 
employer as well as the overall macroeconomic conditions, constraint is a question of 
the individual, the individual's household and the individual's broader social network. 
The success of a search method is normally measured by how many people actually 
found employment through that method. This measurement can be misleading with 
regard to social networks. It is true that successful employment through active 
channels requires that the seeker was using the method to look for a job. For example, 
one has to respond to a newspaper advertisement in order to make contact with the 
employer who placed it. This procedure does not necessarily have to happen with 
social networks. According to a study by Granovetter (1974): 
"For 57.9 percent of the individuals finding their job through 
contacts (N=157), the interaction during which job information was 
passed was, in fact, initiated by the contact. In about half these cases, 
he knew that the respondent was looking for a new job; this means 
that a little over a quarter of the time, initiative come from someone 
who had not been approached and did not know lvhether his friend 
would even be interested. In another 20.9 percent of the instances, 
the respondent contacted his friend, asked him if he knew of 
anything, and was told about the job he subsequently took; 8.3 
percent of the respondents were contacted by someone they did not 
know and were told that they had been recommended for a job. The 
person doing the recommending turned out to be a personal contact 
of the respondent"(Granovetter, 1974: 33, italics added). 
The matching process of employers with unemployed through social networks is 
dependent on the overlap of two networks. According to Tilly and Tilly (1994:301), 
"matching results from the connection of recruitment networks, through which 
employers seek workers, with supply networks, through which potential workers seek 
jobs." The interplay of the two networks will determine the probability of finding a 
job. Although these networks will of necessity overlap, considering the way in which 
networks work, members of each type of network can be to some extent distinct from 
one another. "Both kinds of networks differ dramatically by gender, ethnicity, race, 
age, citizenship, and residence; their articulation therefore has a strong impact on 
what sorts of workers actually get into given firms" (Ibid: 301). 
The advantage of social networks lies in their ability to reduce the transaction costs of 
search for employers as well as for job searchers. This allows both sides to gather and 











distinguishes between three mechanisms through which social networks impact on the 
labour market: extensive search, intensive search and favouritism. The first two 
mechanisms refer to "two distinct inforn1ation problems: becoming aware of various 
job opportunities (extensive search), and collecting in-depth information about the 
quality of one particular opportunity (intensive search),' (Bartus, 2000: 72). The first 
problem impacts on the probability of locating a job, while the second information 
problem influences the occurrence of a match between an open vacancy and the job-
seeker. Intensive search is done by the job-seeker as well as by the employer. Thus, 
the second information problem also impacts on the probability of getting a job. The 
third mechanism refers to favouritism of applicants by employers. "Even when 
employers wish to select on a meritocratic base, they may not be able to do so because 
their social obligations create incentives to favour the friends of their friends, and the 
bargaining power of their employees pushes them toward favouring the friends of 
their employees"(Ibid: 72). Favouritism therefore directly impacts on the probability 
of getting a job. These mechanisms occur in two different network structures. 
4.1.1 Demand Side or Recruitment Networks 
Manwaring (1984) describes the use of social networks as a recruitment method as the 
"extended internal labour market [where] the knowledge of vacancies available to 
employees of a firm is extended beyond the firm, through social networks, to friends 
and relatives of the present workforce within the local community" (Manwaring, 
1984: 161). 
An employer could rely on recruitment networks for various reasons. Besides the fact 
that recruitment networks are the cheapest method of extensive search (Rees, 1966), 
employers can use networks for intensive search. Asymmetric information between 
the employer and the job-seeker can lead to an adverse selection problem. In order to 
identify the best possible match between the vacancy and the job applicant, employers 
have to rely on various screening devises to make an informed decision as to whether 
the applicant fits the job description. Because of imperfect information, the employer 
still has to rely on trust that the applicant's signals are honest and not deceptive. It is 
this problem of trust which makes social networks so important. 
According to a study by Miller and Rosenbaum (1997) the employer's own judgement 
during interviews or references from sources known to the employer were preferred 
and more trusted than high school grades and recommendations from teachers and 
former employers. "In particular, they found that the employer's favourite source of 
information about applicants is their current employees. Employers believe that 
employees have self-interested reasons for recommending good future employees: 
one employer stated, "nobody wants to send someone in who's going to make them 
(the referring employees) look bad" (McEntarfer, 2003: 4). This group pressure 
phenomena has also been identified by Manwaring. "The person who recommends the 
friend or relative is under pressure to ensure that the recruit lives up to expectations: 
'if they let us down they let their friends down' "(Manwaring, 1984: 168). For a 
similar reason Montgomery (1991) suggests that hiring through social networks can 











A further advantage of recruitment networks for the employer lies in the higher 
productivity of the workforce. Manwaring argues that "management attempt to recruit 
a stable core of employees with tacit skills .... Efficient performance requires that 
those skills be applied at a sufficiently intensive and sustained rate to meet production 
targets. This will only be achieved if the new recruit fits into the workgroup within 
which these skills are learnt and applied. By recruiting through the extended internal 
labour market, personnel managers are given an indication that candidates can meet 
these requirements" (Manwaring, 1984: 161). When on-job training is dependent on 
the good will of the existing workforce, social network recruitment can function as a 
"informal apprenticeship system ... because the candidate is already integrated into 
the social relationships with exist within the workgroup" (Ibid: 168). Thus, to keep 
the existing workforce fairly homogenous in order to reduce conflict among different 
groups, employers might favour applicants who fit socially into the existing 
workforce. 
Standing, Sender and Weeks (1996) summarized the implications of informal 
methods for recruitment purposes. 'The informal methods may be less costly, and 
almost certainly reduce transaction costs. It is not altogether clear that there are 
efficiency gains or losses. Recruiting from a pool of relatives, friends, etc., may 
promote group solidarity or efficiency, but may also induce a slackness in the factory, 
More importantly, informal methods are less likely to involve screening in selection 
based on objective criteria of competence" (Standing, Sender & Weeks, 1996: 338). 
4.1.2 Supply Side or Job-seeker Networks 
Very little has been written about the reasons why job-seekers use social networks as 
a search method. Nevertheless, it is possible to establish reasons for job-seeker 
networks based on the theoretical framework in chapter 3 and the probability of 
finding a job. 
Having access to social networks as a job-seeker allows the unemployed to gather 
relevant information at a very low cost. Assuming that the contacts are maintained 
automatically within a social network, one can say that this method implies no 
financial costs. In terms of creating an opportunity cost, relying on social networks do 
not subtract time from any other activity. 
In terms of the probability of finding a job, friends and relatives can increase the 
information flow between job-seekers and employers. Depending on the openness of 
other search channels, social networks can give searchers an advantage in receiving 
more and faster information about available jobs faster. Manwaring (1984) claims that 
"For working-class job-seekers, the extended internal labour market 
provides access to the 'social community' of the workgroup. 
Workers are able to give advice on the precise conditions of work, 
which as personnel managers recognise, is far more likely to be 
trusted than is their own advice. Workers are able to notify friends 
and relatives of jobs coming up, often even before vacancies are 
announced, because they know that someone is leaving, These 











as job-seekers weigh up those salient factors about which they can 
get information and which are seen to vary between firms: the 
severity of managerial discipline, the value of the relationships 
within the 'social community' and the adequacy of the wage 
offer"(Manwaring, 1984: 170). 
Social networks thus directly impact on the probability of locating a job as they 
facilitate intensive as well as extensive search for the unemployed. 
Once a vacancy has been located the job-seeker again uses social networks for his 
benefit. Job-seekers use social networks for similar reasons as employers. While 
recruitment networks reduce the transaction cost of screening for the employer. Joh-
seeker networks reduce the transaction cost of signalling. Screening and signalling 
through social networks are two sides of the same coin. The type of information about 
the candidate which the employer receives is exactly what the applicant wants to 
communicate to the employer. Being able to communicate information about the 
personality of the applicant can give the candidate an advantage over other applicants 
who cannot communicate such personal information. As was indicated above, 
employers are more likely to distrust paper qualifications and references of outsiders 
and prefer recommendations of their existing workforce. Furthermore, "people who 
have heard about the job through an employee will increase their advantage since they 
receive insider information about how to behave during the interview, or how to 
present their CV"(Bartus, 2000: 73). Finally, having direct contacts to people in 
decision making positions (high status contacts) can positively impact on the job-
seeker's application as the contact can positively influence the application by 
recommending the applicant or by putting pressure on the personnel manager. Thus, 
the job-seeker can use social networks to increase the probability of getting a job. 
4.2 Social Networks and Labour Market Outcomes 
The impact of social networks on labour market outcomes has been thoroughly 
documented. Various economic and sociological studies in the US have shown that 
about 50% of all jobs are acquired through social networks. (McEntarfer, 2003: 1) 
The use of social networks seems, despite its presence in all professions, inversely 
related to the level of education and skill, while it increases "with the amount of 
professional networking inherent in the worker's profession" (Ibid: 1). In tenns of 
skill levels, a study of the 1970 Chicago labour market by Rees and Schultz shows 
that unskilled labour uses social networks to get their first job where "85% of 
manufacturing workers are hired through someone they know, compared to 30% of 
accountants"(Ibid: 51). The use of social networks by less skilled workers is 
confirmed in South Africa by Duff and Fryer (2004). 
Furthermore, social networks seem to allow especially younger job-seekers to get 
access to the job market. "Young workers in particular use kinship networks to access 
opportunities in the labour market. As young workers have had little opportunity to 
develop cross-generational contacts outside their own family, the use of relatives in 











In a study of social networks in China, Bian (1997) shows that job-seekers use strong 
ties with contacts in positions of authority to find employment. He claims that the 
probability of getting a job is more important than the probability of locating a job. 
Because job assignments are state controlled, "personal networks are used to gain 
influence from job assigning authorities rather than to gather employment 
information, because even when they have information, job-seeker cannot apply for 
jobs [as] jobs are secretly assigned by officials as favours to those who are directly or 
indirectly connected to them"{Bian, 1997: 367). 
While most studies have shown which groups of people get an advantage though 
social networks, various other studies have analysed the negative impact of social 
networks with regard to the exclusion of certain groups from the labour market. 
Patterson (1998) argues that Afro-Americans have been systematically excluded from 
"essential network resources that most other Americans take for granted"{Patterson, 
1998: 17). While it seems that other ethnic groups have successfully developed 
networks which allow them access to the labour market, Patterson claims that Afro-
Americans were excluded from this process through the systematic implementation of 
institutional obstacles in terms of segregation policies. He sees affirmative action as 
one solution to address the "unfair isolation"{Patterson, 1998: 20). Affirmative action 
should be implemented until a self-sustaining group has developed which allow 
disadvantaged groups have enough access to the labour market. 
Reingold (1999) investigates the employment problems of urban poor in areas of 
Chicago and argues that racial differences have a significant impact on the success of 
finding employment through social networks. Employment of friends and relatives are 
important in expanding employment opportunities for Whites and Puerto Ricans, 
while a higher percentage of employed friends does not increase the probability of 
employment through social networks for Blacks and Mexicans. He suggests that 
either employers do not trust references of employed friends and families of Blacks 
and Mexicans or that in both these groups employed workers are reluctant to function 
as an information broker. His findings would disprove Patterson's argument that 
affirmative action can level the playing field. 
In the South African context, Standing, Sender and Weeks (1996) argue that: 
"[social networks] are more likely to promote or perpetuate forms of 
paternalistic labour relations, and are more likely to perpetuate forms 
of segmentation and stratification, for any group entrenched in some 
job strata is likely to encourage recruitment of others from that 
group. There may also be implications of the pattern of 
unemployment. With informal methods, it is more likely that 
someone will obtain employment if there is already someone in the 
household or kinship circle who is employed"{Standing, Sender and 
Weeks, 1996: 338). 
The implication of this is that job creation programmes might not benefit the most 
marginalised households but rather households "who already have a firm foothold in 











4.3 Social Networks: Facilitators or Constraints? 
Given the importance of social networks in determining labour market outcomes, a 
major problem of networks is that "different social networks do not provide the same 
access to ideas, influence, and information" (McEntarfer, 2003: 5). What factors 
determine whether different network structures increase the probability of locating a 
job or the probability of getting ajob? 
Network analysis looks at different types of social networks and how they generate 
social capital. Social capital here is considered a "metaphor in which social structure 
is a kind of capital that can create for certain individuals or groups a competitive 
advantage in pursuing their ends" (Burt, 2000: 3). In this respect we can consider 
social capital as the "contextual complement to human capital" (Ibid: 2). Being part of 
a social network therefore becomes "an asset in its own right" (Ibid: 2) where capital 
refers to the "sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group 
by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition"(Bourdieu & Wacquant in Burt, 
2000: 2) 
Although scholars agree on the social capital metaphor, they disagree on how these 
networks generate an advantage. When and how does the network create an 
advantage? What does it mean to be 'better connected'? 
The structure of a social network describes the number and quality of links between 
individual A with other individuals. The quality of a link between two individuals is 
dependent on their relationship with one another. The more intensive their 
relationship the stronger is the link between them. According to Granovetter the 
strength of a tie can be defined by "a (probably linear) combination of the amount of 
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie" (Granovetter, 1973: 1361). 
It follows the simple idea that "the more frequently persons interact with one another, 
the stronger their sentiments of friendship for one another are apt to be"(Homan in 
Granovetter, 1973: 1362). Hence, one will associate friendships with people who are 
alike and the intensity of the interaction will increase the strength of this tie. 
A weak tie would therefore be a question of degree whereby the combination of 
frequency and emotional interdependence is far less than for a strong tie. In other 
words, a "relative" or a "close friend" would be considered a strong tie because one 
would assume that the frequency and emotional interdependence of the relationship is 
high. Someone referred to as an "acquaintance" on the other hand would constitute a 
weak tie. The emphasis should lie on the word 'combination' with a higher weighting 
on the emotional interdependence. Even a high frequency relationship with an 
acquaintance still would constitute a weak tie if it does not lead to 'stronger 
sentiments of friendship'. 
The probability that close friends of individual A, which whom she has got frequent 
contact, know each other and have also developed closer ties is very high. A group of 
people linked to one another by strong ties are called a 'clique'. Weak ties on the 











network, but who have ties to people which are unknown to individual A herself. 
(Ibid): 1370. 
How do networks facilitate access to resources which allows individual A to 
successful1y pursue her goals? Two theories of social capital have developed out of 
this question. One theory looks at 'brokerage' between groups while the other focuses 
on the 'closure' of groups. 
Scholars including Granovetter (1973, 1974) and Burt (2000) claim that 'brokerage' 
leads to information diffusion and therefore enhances the individual's access to a 
broader pool of information. They see social capital as a "function of brokerage 
opportunities" between different cliques. The gap between the two cliques, which 
leads to an interruption of the information flow, is described as a "structural 
hole"(Burt, 2000: 5). The function of the broker is to bridge this gap. "People on 
either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of information. Structural 
holes are thus an opportunity to broker the flow of information between people, and 
control the projects that bring together people from opposite sides of the whole" (Ibid: 
5). 
The advantage of a weak tie is the opportunity to get access to a wider pool of 
information and reduce the risk of stagnation and exposure to redundant information. 
Burt identifies two sources of redundancy. "Cohesive contacts (contacts strongly 
connected to each other) are likely to have similar information and therefore provide 
redundant information benefits. Structurally equivalent contacts (contacts who link a 
manager to the same third parties) have the same sources of information and therefore 
provide redundant information benefits"(Ibid: 5) 
Weak ties allow the individual to have access to information and ideas which are 
"socially distant from [the individual]" (Granovetter, 1973: 1371). According to the 
brokerage argument, social networks increase the probability of locating a job as more 
non-redundant information is circulated through the bridging of structural holes. 
The main problem with the brokerage-as-social-capital argument is that it cannot 
explain the motivation which leads to the transmission of information from one closed 
network to another. Why would a member of a clique feel motivated to pass on 
information to an 'acquaintance' of another clique? Burt himself raises the issue by 
claiming that "information can be expected to spread across the people in a market, 
but it will circulate within groups before it circulates between groups"(Burt, 2000: 4 
italics added). He continues to support this argument by stating that "a generic 
research finding in sociology and social psychology is that information circulates 
more within than between groups" which eventually results in the fact that "people 
are not simultaneously aware of opportunities in all groups. Even if information is of 
high quality, and eventually reaches everyone, the fact that diffusion occurs over an 
interval of time means that individuals informed early or more broadly have an 
advantage"(Ibid: 4). 
It seems that the question of motivation is better answered by the 'closure' argument. 
"A closed network is one whose members have close connections to one another with 
no or relatively few connections outside the group. Within a closed network, the 











members, and sanctions facilitated by network closure reduce the risks associated 
with trusting fellow members. By facilitating the transmission of information within a 
network, network closure is a source of social capital for its members" (King & 
Waldegrave, 2003) 
The main advantage of a closed network is the creation of non-tangible values like 
trust, solidarity and obligation. The high level of interdependence is created by the 
fact that either the welfare of the entire group will change with the actions of the 
individual members or that reputation among the members ofthe group have created a 
code of conduct which prevents members from free riding and moral hazard. 
The closure argument is directly related to the transaction cost approach in 
institutional economics. Problems of coordination, motivation and commitment are 
key issues in the transaction cost approach. Incomplete information and asymmetric 
distribution of information (private information) give some agents power in the 
market through opportunistic behaviour. Adverse selection and moral hazard are 
normally outcomes of this problem where agents either hide information (adverse 
selection) or alter their behaviour after an agreement has been reached (moral hazard). 
"Fear of opportunism may deter parties from relying on one another as much as they 
should for efficiency" (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992: 128-129). 
Why then are closed networks better equipped to address the problem of motivation? 
As Coleman puts it, Hthe consequence of [this] closure is ... a set of effective 
sanctions that can monitor and guide behaviour. Reputation cannot arise in an open 
structure, and collective sanctions that would ensure trustworthiness cannot be 
applied" (Coleman in Burt, 2000: 8-9). 
Hence, while the governing rules of the strong tie seem to create stronger incentives 
for individuals to share with their other links, it seems that weak ties are more crucial 
in the diffusion of information through the bridging of strong networks. Granovetter 
illustrates this paradox of the workings of social networks. "A natural a priori idea is 
that those with whom one has strong ties are more motivated to help with job 
information. Opposed to this greater motivation are the structural arguments ... those 
to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles different from our own 
and will thus have access to information different from that which we receive" 
(Grano vetter, 1973: 1371). This explains the counterproductive effect social networks 
can have on the probability of finding a job as was identified by Duff and Fryer 
(2004). Nevertheless, various examples as well as Granovetter's study have shown 
"the primacy of structure over motivation" (Ibid: 1371). As he recalls, "it is 
remarkable that people receive crucial information from individuals whose very 
existence they have forgotten" (Ibid: 1372) 
The most effective network structure is a mixture between closure and brokerage. 
While bridging structural holes creates opportunities for the broker as well as for the 
closed network of the broker by giving the bridging individual access to new, non-
redundant information, it is closure and the enforcement of motivation which ensures 
the actual distribution of the information. Burt concludes that "while brokerage across 
structural holes is the source of value added, closure can be critical to realizing the 











Given the conflict between the closure and the brokerage argument, what conditions 
would make the use of social networks most effective? Boorman (1975) developed a 
model showing the transmission of job information through contact networks. His 
assumption about the dynamics of job information transmission follows a 
"hierarchical priority rule: 
Priority rule: 
a) If individual A needs a job, and hears directly of a vacancy, she takes it; 
b) If individual A does not need it herself, she reviews her strong contacts and 
their needs; if any of these strong ties needs a job, individual A allocates the 
job at random to one of these contacts; 
c) If none of individual A's strong contacts needs the job, the allocation rule b) is 
repeated using individual A's weak instead of her strong contacts" (Boorman, 
1975:222) 
The priority rule shows that the probability of finding a job is higher the closer the 
job-seeker is to individual A given that the information about the vacancy is mainly 
transmitted through the recruitment network. 
One can also assume that the motivation to give a contact a reference would follow a 
similar priority rule. It is more likely that individual A is willing to give a strong link 
a reference than a weaker link. According to Granovetter, the shorter the chain the 
higher is the probability of contacts "putting in a good word" (Granovetter, 1974: 58). 
At the same time one can assume that employers are more inclined to trust a reference 
of an existing employee for a relative or a close friend rather than for an acquaintance. 
Thus, the potential to take advantage of one's social capital is dependent on one's 
position within various network structures. The further away from a particular 
individual that one wants to reach, the higher the costs of reaching and the lower the 
possible advantage generated through this contact. "There may be a distance (length 
of path) beyond which it is not feasible for [person A who needs the information] to 
communicate with [person B holding the information] because the costs or distortions 
entailed in each act of transmission. If A does not lie within the critical distance, then 
he will not receive messages originating from B" (Haray et al in Granovetter, 1973: 
1364-1365). 
The implication of the closure argument and Boorman's priority rule is that the 
success of social networks is determined by the proximity of the job-seeker to 
individuals who are either employed or members of the recruitment network. "The 
opportunities presented to individuals in the labour market are not easily separated 
from the individual's position in the social infrastructure. The worker's social network 
will determine what job opportunities he hears about as well as his likelihood of 
obtaining a particular job" (McEntarfer, 2003: 7). The main problem of the 
recruitment network is its exclusive nature. "The extended internal labour market is 
regarded as being the most 'closed' channel because a job-seeker has to have a friend 
or a relative in the firm in order to be able to find out about a job"(Manwaring, 1984: 
162). Although weak ties might lead to higher information diffusion through 
brokerage, in times of high unemployment such crucial information like the 
knowledge of open vacancies are less likely to leave the circle of a closed network, 











reduced. The implications are significant. The search success is determined by the 
overlap of the job-seeker network with the recruitment network. The better the 
overlap between the two networks, the higher is the probability of locating and getting 
a job, and vice versa. Even a broad network will not generate an employment 
advantage to the individual when the contacts themselves are not part of the 
recruitment network. 
In conclusion we can say that social networks are facilitators as well as constraints. 
Simply being part of a social network does not give equal access to the labour market 
compared to members of other social networks. The proximity of the job-seeker to the 
recruitment network is crucial. Thus, having friends and family who are employed 
increases the overlap of the supply side network and the recruitment network. Not 
having these contacts renders the use of social networks less effective for the job-
seeker. We can therefore assume that the availability of contacts determines the 
decisions of the job-seeker to utilize these social networks. 
In the following study we concentrate on the quantity of contacts not on the quality of 
networks. Although the quality of networks is crucial in the analysis of social 
networks, the data of the unemployed job searchers did not generate sufficient 
information to do this kind of investigation. We do have some information on the 
quality of networks from workers who got employed through networks. Therefore, 












5. Empirical Analysis of Search Activity in the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's 
Plain Survey 
In 2000 the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) in 
collaboration with the Institute for Social Research (ISR) of the University of 
Michigan developed and conducted a survey in the magisterial district of Mitchell's 
Plain. This area houses almost three quarters of the African and over a fifth of the 
Coloured Cape Town metropolitan population. 
The aim of the survey was to establish a better picture of labour market issues by 
exploring "the extent to which livelihoods, and in particular labour market behaviour, 
involved individuals in multiple activities [because] high poverty and unemployment 
rates in South Africa necessitate that households involve their members in multiple 
activities as part of their livelihood strategies"(SALDRU, 2003: 2). 
Although the survey is neither representative of the Cape Town metropolitan area nor 
of South Africa as a whole by only looking at an urban sample of mainly members of 
the African and coloured working class, it can give valuable insights into factors 
which influence the search behaviour of the semi- and unskilled unemployed. 
5.1. Descriptive Analysis of Search Activity in Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain 
In total, 2644 adults in 1176 households responded to questions about their individual 
characteristics and their labour market activities. For the purpose of this thesis, we 
will concentrate on the previous search activities of currently wage employed workers 
and the search activities of the unemployed to identify the importance of various 
search strategies and the factors which constrain or facilitate the pursuit of these 
search strategies. 
5.1.1 Successful Employment Methods of the Currently Wage Employed 
Table 2. summarises how currently employed workers found their jobs. 
T bl 2 B kd fh th E df de tW J b a e . rea owno ow e mplOye oun urren age 0 . 
~I!~sful~mployment method Number Percentage 
.!.J:ie~s2a2er ad 77 9.8 
12 HH member told mea bout job 77 9,8 
304 38,5 .3 Different HH told me about job 
4 HH member got me ajob 32 4,1 
15 Different HHgot mea job 83 10,5 
j6 Went to factory 87 11,0 
7 Knocked 0 11 gates/doors 68 8,6 
i8 Em21oymel1! agency 30 3,8 
j9 Previous eI11ployer 23 2,9 
110 Waited side of the road 3 0,4 I 
11 Notice boards 5 0,6 i 
iTotal 789 i 100 











Around 63% of the currently employed workers found employment through social 
networks, i.e. where friends or family either told the job-seeker about a job or 
organized a job for the job-seeker at the contact's workplace. It is interesting to see 
the significance of networks outside of the own household. Friends and relatives of a 
different household are an important factor in job search. Almost 50% of the currently 
employed found employment through friends and family living in different 
households. Of these, it shows that having a wide network of friends and family gives 
job searchers better access to the labour market and to relevant market information. 
Of the employed, 38.5% reported that they received information about available jobs 
from friends and family outside of the job-seeker's household. 
As the table shows, networks in general fulfil the crucial role of an information 
transmitter which increases the probability of locating a job. Close to 50% of the 
currently employed were informed about an available job by household members or 
by members of a different household. Contacts function to a lesser extent as a direct 
entrance into employment, i.e. the probability of getting a job. Less than 15% of the 
employed had contacts who could organize a job for the job-seeker at the contact's 
workplace. Again, contacts outside of the job-seeker's household were more 
important in facilitating direct access to employment (10.5%) than household 
members (4.1 %). 
In this thesis we are concerned with the ways in which the unemployed can get access 
to wage employment. We therefore have to distinguish between the employment 
methods of the currently employed who were employed before they changed to their 
current job and workers who were unemployed before they started their current job. 
We refer to the first group as 'on-job-searchers' who did not change their labour 
market status, and the second group as 'previously unemployed' who changed their 
labour market status from unemployment into employment. 
T bl 3 B k f 0 . 14 a e : rea down 0 ' . n-.Job-searchers' and 'Previously Unemployed' 
ISuccessful Employment method i~n-jOb-SearCher iPreviously unemployed 
. Number %, lNumber 0/0 
i 1 ) Newspaper advertisement 39 11.8 37 8.7 
12) HH member told me about job 31 904 44 i lOA 
13l Different HH told me about job 121 36,5 164 38.7 
:4) HH member got me a job 12 i 3.6 20 4.7 
i5) Different HH got me a job 39 11.8 41 9.7~ 
16) Went to fact0IY-.- 28 8.5 56 13.2 
17) Knocked on gates/doors 28 8.5 37 8.7 
182 EmEloyment agencl' 
I 
15 4.5 15 I 3.5 
19} Previous emElol'er 13 4 7 1.7 
110) Waited side of the road 2 0.6 1 0.2 i 
Ill) Notice boards 3 i 0.9 2 0.5 
l 
I .. --
!Total 331 10015 I 424 100 1 --.. 
Source: KMP 2000, own ca1culallons 
14 Total number of on-job-searcher and previously unemployed do not add up to total number of 
currently employed because of missing observations. 











Looking at table 3 we can see that the majority of members in both groups found 
employment through the help of friends and relatives. Slightly more previously 
unemployed found employment through social networks (63.5%) compared to on-job-
searchers (61.3%). Interestingly, it was more important for the previously 
unemployed to get access to information about open vacancies. Almost 50% of the 
previously unemployed found employment after friends and relatives told them about 
the vacancy compared to 45.9% of the on-job searchers. 
On-job searches are more successful in the use of formal channels in that 16.2% of 
them found their current employment through answering newspaper advertisements or 
employment agencies compared to 12.2% of the previously unemployed. On the other 
hand, more previously unemployed were successful in finding employment through 
going to factories. 
Table 4: Characteristics of the Previously Unemploved . 
I Search Race Gender 
i 
Age Education Total 
method (years) 
Afr Col M F Med Mean Med Mean 
Newspaper 24 13 15 22 28 30 12 10.5 37 
(8; 65) (10;35) (7; 40) (11; 60) 
! HH Info 23 21 19 25 26 27 10 9.5 44 
(8; 52) (17;48) (9; 43) (12; 57) 
10th HH Info 107 57 77 87 29 31 9 8.8 164 
I (36; 65) (46; 35) (36; 47) (42; 53) 
HHjob 18 2 10 10 26 27 9 9 
! 
20 
(6; 90) (2; 10) (5; 50) (5; 50) 
• Oth HHjob 29 12 27 14 28 30 9 8.5 41 
~ .. 
(10; 70) (10;30) (12; 66) (7; 34) 
Went to • 49 7 40 16 28 30 I 9 8 56 
factory (16; 88) (6; 12) (18; 71) (8; 29) 
Knocked on 33 4 19 18 29 31 8 8 37 
2ates/doors (11; 89) (3; 11) (9; 51) (9; 49) 
. Empl agency 11 4 8 7 28 29 11 10 15 
I (4; 73) (3; 27) (4; 53) (3; 47) 
I Previous 4 3 2 5 29 30 10 9 7 
I Em~loye;;t (1; 58) (2; 42) (l; 29) (2; 71) 
Side of road 1 0 0 1 ! l'i'o l'i'o 0 0 1 
~i _~ (0; 100) (0; 0) (0; 0) (.5; 100) obs. obs. 








I ;\fotice board 
(0; 50 (1; 50) I (1; 100) (0; 0) 
i TotaVAvg 300 124 219 205 28 
I 
30 9 8.9 424 I 
• (100; 71) (100; 29) (100; 52) (100; 48) I 
Source: KMP 2000, o'Wn ca1culatlOns, Number (Column 'l'o: Row %) 
The majority of African workers (60%) used networks with 44% getting an advantage 
by increasing their probability of finding a job and 16% using networks to improve 
their probability of getting a job. Among the coloured workers, 75% used networks to 
get employed. Of these, 63% were informed about vacancies while for only 12% the 
job was organized by the contact. Thus networks are far more important for Coloured 
job-seekers in terms of creating an advantage in locating a job. In terms of active 
methods, a significantly higher proportion of Africans goes from place to place. More 
than one quarter of the African workers (27%) went to factories and/or knocked on 











Women are slightly more successful in getting employed through social networks 
than men with 66% of the female workers compared to 62% of the male workers. 
Getting access to information and thereby increasing the probability of locating a job 
was more important for women with 54% of the female employed getting informed 
about job opportunities compared to 45% of all men. On the other hand, getting into 
the job through the reference of a contact was more important for men with 17% of 
the male employed compared to 11 % of all female employed. Females are more 
successful in getting employed through formal channels while 27% of all men found 
employment through directly contacting the employer. 
In terms of age, most of the previously unemployed were around 30 years old at the 
time of their employment. The exceptions to this are the workers who got employed 
either by a member of the household telling them about a vacancy or where a 
household member organized employment for them at the household member's 
workplace. These were on average 3 years younger than all other workers. In line with 
McEntarfer's claim (2003) this might indicate that older household members look out 
for their younger members or that networks are still quite limited to the household for 
younger work seekers while older work-seekers have a more extended social network 
on which they can draw. 
Educational levels do not differ significantly among the workers. Nevertheless, the 
results support Duff and Fryer's findings (2004) that formal methods correlate with 
higher educational attainments. What is interesting is the similar pattern of the 
network searchers. Workers who found employment through household members 
have slightly more years of education than workers who found employment through 
the help of members of different households. This might again suggest that the 
workers who got help from household members might be younger workers with 











Therefore, how effective are certain search methods III terms of the duration of 
unemployment as well as wage differentials? 
T bl 5 Ch a e : t 'f fthP arac ens ICS 0 e I U reVlOusty nempJoye d 
Search Wagel6 Length of HH Empl. While i Total 
method unemployment Unemp. 
Med Mean Med Mean Yes No 
• Newspaper 1634 2188 12 24 10 ! 27 37 I I 
(8,27) I (9,73) (9,100) 
HH Info I 1550 1617 12 23 24 I 20 44 
(20,55) (7,45) (10,100) 
. Oth HH Info 1375 1650 24 31 59 I 105 164 
(50,35) (34,64) (39,100) 
HHjob 1290 1382 30 36 8 12 20 
(7,40) (4,60) (5,100) 
·OthHHjob 1200 1630 18 32 7 34 41 
(6,17) (11,83) (10,100) 
Went to 1400 1615 23 34 4 52 56 
I factory (3,7) (17,93) (13,100) 
Knocked on 1200 1344 15 24 2 35 37 
gates/doors (2,5) ( 11,95) (9,100) 
! Empl agency 1634 1847 12 29 2 13 15 
(2,13 ) (4,87) (4,100) 
Previous 980 1090 6 12 3 4 7 
employer (3,43) (1,57) (2,100) 
Side of road 360 360 16 16 0 1 1 
i (0,0) (0,100) (0,100) 
Notice board 2600 2600 95 9517 I 0 2 2 
(0,0) (1,1 00) (0,100) 
Total/Avg 1400 1646 16.5 30 119 305 424 
i (100,28) (100,72) 
Source: KMP 2000, 0""11 CalculatIOns, Number (Column %; Row %) 
Wage differentials of different employment methods can evolve from various factors. 
These include different economic sectors, time spent on the job, educational levels, 
race and gender. Nevertheless, the findings do seem to support Duff and Fryer's 
argument that the search method is to some extent a proxy for the ability to send a 
signal of quality. Formal channels yield the highest wage rates while place-to-place 
methods give access to low paid jobs. Wages of social network jobs are below wages 
of formal channels but significantly higher than place-to-place jobs. 
One measure of the effectiveness of a search method could be the length of time the 
person was unemployed before finding employment. This has to be treated with 
caution as we do not know for how long the unemployed had pursued the search 
method. He or she might also have pursued other search methods before the method 
which eventually enabled him or her to get employed. Generally, people are on 
average unemployed for two to three years. Except for household members telling the 
job searcher about a job, all other network methods take very long to get a job-seeker 
employed, It is possible that job-seekers start off looking for work through active 
channels and as the duration of their unemployment prolongs they rely increasingly 
16 'Wage' was calculated using 'basic wage' (e9) and the payment modus (e8). The basic wage was 
multiplied by 28 for a daily wage, by 4 for a weekly wage, by 2 for a biweekly wage, and by 1 for a 
monthly wage. 











on social networks to find employment. Another explanation might be that there is no 
pressure on the unemployed to find employment. The third column shows how many 
of the previously unemployed lived in households which had at least one employed 
member. Proportionally more network employed lived in households with 
employment than active channel employed did. This could mean two things: firstly, 
household employment does give better access to the labour market and these contacts 
are used to gain an advantage, at the same time household employment might extend 
the length of unemployment as it raises the reservation wage. 
As we want to understand how search affects the probability of getting employed, it is 
crucial to look at the search activities of the previously unemployed. The previously 
unemployed were asked in the survey if they had engaged in any kind of search 
activity during the last month of their unemployment. 
Table 6. Search Methods used by Previously Unemployed while Unemployed . . ... . .. 
I Su" ... (u) method of Search Methods used while Unemployed 
employment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total l ' 
i 
i 1) Newspaper 34 27 26 i 25 25 19 17 17 16 3 15 37 
2) HH Info 29 36 39 36 39 21 16 10 9 8 18 44 
3) Oth HH Info 97 144 162 148 155 104 96 i 53 57 37 68 164 
• 4) HH Job 9 17 17 18 17 14 II 7 5 6 5 20 
5) OthHH Job 18 ·30 36 29 34 26 22 17 i 14 11 16 41 
6) Going to factories 22 42 44 44 45 51 39 l7 19 15 25 56 
· 7) Knocking on 15 24 25 23 25 27 29 9 9 11 14 37 
j doors/gates 
I 8) EmEI agency 7 ·7 7 9 8 5 5 9 3 2 4 15 
i 9)Prev. EI11Ployer 4 6 7 5 7 5 5 1 6 1 2 7 
· 10) Side of road 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 I 1 1 
11)Notice boards 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 12 
Total 237 334 364 338 356 274 242 141 139 95 l70 424 
Source. KMP 2000, own calculatIOns 
These results have to be interpreted with caution. The average time passed since the 
previously unemployed engaged in these search activities is around five years. One 
has to wonder therefore to what extent the respondents can still remember their 
activity in the last month of their unemployment. Especially, one might expect that 
they remember all activities which they have ever engaged in without necessarily 
being able to place these activities in a particular time period. This then would be one 
explanation for the high number of mix strategy searchers. 
Nevertheless, the majority indicates that they did engage in the search activity which 
eventually has led to their employment (shaded area). Furthermore, it is interesting to 
see that workers who got employed through active channels also pursued passive 
search methods and vice versa. 














But which search methods do they actually consider to be most appropriate for their 
level of skill and experience? 
Table 7. Best Search Method for Skill Level (Prev~ouslv Unemploved) 
Best search method for skill level and experience 
• Successful method of 1 2 • 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Other Total 
I employment 
i 
1) Newspaper 20 0 ! 2 0 10 1 0 7 1 0 0 3 34 I 
2) HH Info 6 11 5 3 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 2 35 
• 3) Oth HH Info 28 17 53 0 4 12 15 10 3 0 !2 3 147 I 




5) Oth HH Job 7 1 3 3 • 34 I 
6) Going factories 9 2 15 2 45 I 
7) Knock on doors 5 2 2 14 3 0 1 33 • 
8) Empl agency 4 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 0 0 1 12 
9) Prevo Employer 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 2 6 
10) Side of road 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 I 
11) Notice boards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ·0 0 2 0 2 
I Total 87 35 79 10 19 40 42 271 5 1 i 5 17 367 
Source: KMP 2000. Own Calculations 
Only the respondents who were either picked up at the side of the road or looked at 
notice boards to find employment consider this search method to be the most 
appropriate for their experience and level of skill. Among the workers who found 
employment through newspaper advertisements, 41 % said that this is not the best 
search method for their level of skill and experience. Only 6% of them would use 
social networks as their main search method, while 20% would use employment 
agencies. A similar pattern is reported by the workers who went through employment 
agencies. Both groups consider social networks as less appropriate for looking for a 
job. If one considers all types of social networks as one search method, it is still 
remarkable that almost 50% of all successful social network employed consider active 
search methods as more appropriate. This either indicates that they pursued active as 
well as passive search methods during their unemployment (as was indicated in table 
6) or that various factors hindered them from using active search methods. A similar 
question could be asked about the direct-contact employed. Between 25% and 30% of 











If it is the case that most previously unemployed pursued active as well as passive 
search methods, what factors distinguish the workers who found employment through 
active channels from the workers who found employment through social networks? 
Table 8: Logistic Regression of EIllployment Method 
i Logit: Networ~employed '1' Active Emploved '0' 
'_ ...... __ I _ 





· Age -.0052 
(.0134) 
I Education ~.O859* 
(.0464) 
! No Education -1.7508** 
(.6910) 
i Married -.5339** ! 
(.2585) 
Unemployment Length .0030 
(.0030) 
HH Employment 1.1975*** 
• (at time of getting employed) (.2931) 





I Number of observations 396 
I ....... 
LR chi2(9) 41.34 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0800 
Slgmficance levels: t between 10-20%, * 10%; ** 5%; and *** 1 % 
The most striking result of the regression is the significance of employment in the 
household at the time when the currently employed found employment. It is 
interesting that the most significant difference between passive and active method 
employed is the presence of at least one employed household member. This gives 
support to the argument that the position of the job-seeker with regard to the 
recruitment network is crucial. 
It is surprising how little individual characteristics explain the employment method. 
Gender and age are statistically insignificant Race is only weakly significant but it 
suggests that more members of the coloured community are successfully employed 
through social networks. This might be explained by the fact that the coloured 
community has got a lower unemployment rate l9 (broad unemployment rate of 35%) 
compared to the African community (broad unemployment rate of 51 %) and that 
social networks are still mainly along racial lines. Generally, the statistical 
insignificance of these individual characteristics might be the outcome of the 
19 Broad unemployment rate for KMP calculated with all employment categories (not only wage 











aggregation of the various search methods. A more disaggregated breakdown might 
give better insights. 
Although the regression indicates that social network employed are less involved in 
close relationships (married or living with partner), this result has to be interpreted 
with caution as this variable refers to the current marital status of the respondent, not 
to the status at the time of looking and finding employment. We do not know if the 
marital status of the respondent changed. It could have been that the marital status had 
an impact on the search method. On the other hand, it could also be that the marital 
status changed after the respondent got employed. 
The results also seem to support the claim that years of education do explain the 
difference between the two groups. More education would increase the probability of 
the searcher using active search methods. By controlling for some education 
compared to no education at all, network employed nevertheless exhibit more 
exposure to education. Again, this seems to support Duff and Fryer's argument (2004) 
that the search method is an indicator of ability with highly educated job-seekers 
using formal channels and less educated job-seekers having to rely either on social 
networks or on directly contacting employers. 
The inclusion of the wage variable in the regression is problematic. Wage differentials 
themselves are explained by gender, race, age, education and maybe even the search 
method itself. Excluding the wage variable did not change the outcome of the 
regression or the coefficients significantly. The insignificance of the wage variable 
might also be the outcome of the aggregation of the whole range of all search methods 
into only 2 strategies. Duff and Fryer's breakdown (2004) might give better insights 
into the relationship between the search method and the wage differentials. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, we are less concerned with the success of 
the search method measured in wages but rather with factors influencing the choice of 
the search method. 
In summary we can say that the main distinction between workers who got employed 
through social networks and workers who got employed through active channels was 
their position in the various network structures. Network employed seemed to have 
been closer to the recruitment network. 
5.1.2 Unemployed Searchers and Their Search Methods 
Given the above results what kind of search behaviour do the currently unemployed 
engage in? 
T hI 9 S a e .. eare bS trategles 0 fe I U urrently nemploye d· KMPS lD urvev 
• Search Strategy Number Percentage 
Exclusive Active 235 24 
Exclusive Passive 143 15 
Mixed Strategy 260 27 
Non Searching _ .. 334 34 
! Total 972 100 
~ 












These categories have been adapted from Nattrass (2003). The main difference lies in 
the breakdown of the active searchers into exclusive active searchers and searchers 
who use active channels as well as social networks. The latter group is referred to as 
mixed strategy searchers. This allows us to investigate more precisely the factors 
which influence the choice of the searcher to employ either active search methods or 
passive search methods. Respondents were allowed to give multiple answers which 
make an even more disaggregated breakdown of the search methods of the 
unemployed impractical. 
The data shows that more than one third of the unemployed who want a job are not 
searching. Of all the unemployed, 24% use exclusively active search methods, 15% 
rely exclusively on the assistance of friends and relatives while the remaining 27% 
use a mixed strategy of active and passive search channels. 
It was argued in the theoretical framework that the choice of the search method is a 
mixture of feasibility and effectiveness. The survey asked the unemployed to evaluate 
the effectiveness of certain search methods for the respondent's level of skill and 
experience. Respondents were not asked directly about the feasibility of certain search 
options except for some general questions on aspects which can impact on the ability 
to search. We therefore do know which search methods the respondents perceive to be 
the most effective for them. In addition, we know which search methods they pursue, 
but we do not know why they chose these methods, or more particularly, why some 
searchers do not pursue methods which they perceive to be more appropriate. 
Respondents were not asked why they decided not to pursue certain search methods. 
Hence, we do not know the mental state of the respondent and what factors led to the 
decision to engage in a particular search strategy. 
Nevertheless, following the theoretical framework with regard to aspects which make 
a search option effective and feasible, we can analyse characteristics of the different 
search groups in order to deduce possible reasons for choosing the type of search 
activity. 
Table 10. Individual Characteristics of Currently Unemployed 
[SearCh I Race Gender I --'--A~g'-e----'---E-d-u-c-a-tio-n--i-T-o-ta-I~i 
method (Years) i i 
Afr Col M F Med Mean Med Mean 
i Excl. active 185 
1 
50 I 100 135 27 i 31 9 8.6 235 
I (24; 79) (25; 21) i (29; 43) (21; 57) 
i Excl passive 109 34 I 47 96 ! 28 i 30 i 9 8.3 143 
I (14; 76) (17; 24) (13; 33) (15; 67) I 
: Mix Strategy 214 46 118 142 ! 27 30 i 9 8.9 260 
I Non sea~ch (28; 82) (23; 18) (34; 45) (23; 55) 264 66 85 249 29.5 33 8 7.9 
1
334 
(34; 79) (34;21) (24; 25) (40; 75) I 
I TotalJAvg 771 
I 
196 350 i 622 28 I 31.4 9 8.4 .972 
I (100; 80) (100; 20) JIOO;36) L (100; 64) I I 
Source: KMP 2000. own calculatIOns, Number (Column %; Row 70) 
Table 10 shows the individual characteristics of the unemployed who want a job. The 
total racial breakdown mirrors the demographic characteristic of the Mitchell's Plain 
magistrate. Proportionally, the same amount of African unemployed and Coloured 













searchers rely on exclusive network search while more African Unemployed pursue a 
mixed strategy of active and passive search. 
In terms of gender differences, in the entire sample there are almost double as many 
females as men. Females are proportionally more represented in the non-searching 
group compared to men with a ratio of 3:l. Active and mixed strategies are more 
important for men while females rely more on social networks to find a job. Thus, 
gender seems to strongly determine the intensity of search with females having to rely 
on passive search or do not search at all. 
The unemployed are on average 30 years and older with the majority of the searchers 
being younger than 30. Non-searchers are the oldest group which might indicate 
discouragement while the searching unemployed do not show any particular age 
differences. 
None of the unemployed groups exhibit very high levels of education with an average 
number of 8.4 years. The non-searching unemployed show the lowest level of 
education followed by the exclusive network searchers. The mixed strategy searcher 
received the highest level of education. These results can be misleading because of the 
aggregation of the search methods. Following Duff and Fryer (2004), one could 
expect that newspaper advertisement searchers and unemployed workers registered 
with an employment agency might have more years of education. 
T bl 11 I d"d I Ch a e .. n IVI ua t 'f fC arac ens ICS 0 tI U urren ly nemploye d 
. Search Length of Local (CT) Total 
I method Unemployment 
Med Mean Yes No 
Excl. active 24 38 54 165 219 
25,25) (24,75) (32,100) 
Excl 24 38 40 95 135 
. passive 
• 
(19,30) (14,70) (15,100) 
Mix 24 34.5 
I 
53 191 244 
Strategy (25,22) (28,78) (27,100) 
Non search 24 50 69 230 299 
(32,23) (34,77) (33,100) 
• Total/Avg 24 41 216 681 897 
(100,24) (100,76) 
Source: KMP 2000, o\~n calculatIOns. Number (Column%; Row%) 
The majority of the unemployed have been unemployed for up to 2 years. The length 
of unemployment according to the search method is difficult to interpret. The reason 
that mixed strategies have the shortest length of unemployment might either indicate 
that this is the most effective search method in finding employment or that searchers 
pursue all possible search methods in the beginning of their unemployment while they 
focus on either active or passive search as the unemployment spell drags on. It could 
also indicate that mixed strategy search is the more successful search strategy. A 
breakdown of the different lengths of unemployment though does not reveal any 
particular pattern (see Appendix Table Ai). 
Proportionally, locally born job-seekers are more inclined to rely on social networks 











In the theoretical framework we argued that household characteristics have a crucial 
impact on the choice of the search method as they either constrain or facilitate search. 
Table 12 shows various household characteristics which can influence the search 
behaviour of the unemployed. 





Labour Market I HH Income I HH I HH 
l method contacts • per Cap20 . Adult . Child 
Yes No Yes No ! Med Mean! size size 
I Excl. active I 
116 119 95 136 200 273.2 3.41 1.72 i 
(25; 49) (24; 51) (21; 40) (27; 60) ! (1.71) (1.81 ) 
Excl passive 77 66 86 53 233 318.4 ! 3.52 1.67 
i 
(16; 54) (14; 46) (19; 60) • (10; 40) ! (1.66) i ( 1.57) 
Mix Strategy i 117 143 153 I 107 200 270.2 I 3.40 I 1.56 
I 
(25; 45) (28; 55) i (34; 59) . (20; 41) (1.63) i (1.41 ) 
i 
I i i 
I Non search 157 177 i J17 I 215 211 286.4 I 3.13 • 1.82 i 
(34; 48) (35; 52) (26; 35) i (42; 65) (1.56) i (1.59) 
I Total/Avg 467 505 451 511 200 283.5 I 3.33~ 1.7 
I (100; 48) (100; 52) (100; 46) (100; 53) (1.64) (1.62) 
Source: KMP 2000. OI'ITl catculal1oTls. "'I'umber (Column%; ROlv"10 or Standard Error) 
Exclusive network searchers are the only group which has a posItlve household 
employment ratio. More exclusive network searchers live in households with 
employment than without. As mentioned above, this could either mean that passive 
searchers are living off other employed members of the household or that the 
employed member increases the probability of locating and getting a job with very 
low search costs. What is surprising is that of all the different search groups, mixed 
strategy searchers have the lowest household employment ratio. This might indicate 
that they have to rely more on the assistance of friends and family in other 
households. 
This seems to be confirmed when one looks at the number of unemployed who claim 
that they have contacts that can get them access to the labour market. Non searchers 
have got the lowest number of contacts to the labour market, followed by the 
exclusive active searchers. Exclusive network searchers as well as mixed strategy 
searchers have a positive ratio of labour market contacts with exclusive network 
searchers being the most connected group of the unemployed. This suggests that the 
choice of the search method is strongly influenced by the number of labour market 
contacts. The more contacts are available the lower is the incentive to search actively. 
The less contacts that are available the more likely is the job searcher to start to 
engage in active search until the searcher either relies exclusively on active search or 
stops searching. 
Household ineome per member of the household is the smallest for mixed strategy 
searchers. Exclusive active searchers have on average only slightly more per capita 
household income compared with the mixed strategy searchers. Non searchers and 
exclUSIve network searchers live in households with significantly higher per capita 
household incomes, of which the exclusive network searchers have got the highest per 
capita household income. Although this could be the outcome of outliers in the data, 
the higher median indicates that the majority of the households do show higher 
incomes per person. This might indicate that non-searchers are voluntarily 


















unemployed and social network searchers have little incentive to search more 
intensively. 
On average, social network searchers live in households with more adult members. 
Exclusive active and mixed strategy searcher households have only slightly less adult 
members in the household while non-searchers live in households with the lowest 
number of adults. In terms of children, mixed strategy searchers have the lowest 
number of children in the household and non searchers have the highest number of 
children. Non searchers therefore might be constrained in pursuing active search 
because of being tied up in domestic duties while they lack the labour market contacts 
to rely on social networks. 
Table 13. Search Behaviour of other Household Members 
I Search HH Active Search HH Passive Search I HHMixed Total 
method Strategy Search 
• 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Excl. active 42 193 19 216 46 189 235 
(26; 18) (24; 82) (22; 8) (24; 92) (24; 20) (24; 80) 
Excl passive 18 125 23 120 25 118 143 
(11; 13) (15; 87) (26; 16) (14; 84) (13; 17) (15;83) 
Mix Strategy 48 212 28 232 69 191 260 
(30; 18) (26; 82) 32; 1 I) (26; 89) (37; 27) (25; 73) 
Non search 54 ! 280 18 316 49 285 334 
(33;16) (35; 84) (20; 5) (36; 95) (26; 15) (36; 85) 
Total/Avg 162 . 810 88 884 189 783 972 
(100; 17) I (100; 83) (100; 9) (100; 91) (l00; 19) (100 81) 
Source: KMP 2000. O\m calculatIOns. 'lumber (Column%; Row'%) 
Table 13 shows the number of searchers living in households which have at least one 
other household member who engages in search21 . Thus, 42 exclusive searchers live 
in households were at least one other household member engages in exclusively active 
search. The majority of mixed strategy searchers (56%) live in households with at 
least one other member engaging in search. Only 46% of both exclusive active and 
exclusive passive searchers live in households with other searching members while 
only 36% of the non searchers live in households where at least one member reports 
to engage in some kind of search activity. 
Among the exclusive active searchers and the mixed strategy searchers, 18% of each 
group live in households where other household members pursue exclusive active 
search. Social network searchers have the lowest number of exclusive active searchers 
in their households. In terms of passive search, proportionally more social network 
searchers live in households where at least one more member is an exclusive network 
searcher than any other search group, followed by mixed strategy searchers. With 
regard to mixed strategy search in households, all searching groups have, compared to 
other household search methods, more mixed strategy searching members in their 
household. More than one quarter of the mixed strategy searchers (27%) live in 
households with other mixed strategy searchers. The above findings suggest that the 
choice of the search method is a household-level characteristic. The household seems 
to create some kind of search culture. 
21 The variable shows a rough indicator of other search activity in the household. The search behaviour 
of the respondent is subtracted from the household search for the same search strategy in order to 











After we have established the individual and household characteristics of the various 
unemployment groups, the question is which search method do they perceive to be the 
most appropriate. 
Table 14: Best Search Method for Skill Level (Currentlv Unemploved) 
I Best Search method Non Search Excl Pass Excl Act I Mix Str. Total 
11) Newspaper 67 26 73 55 I 221 ! 
(21,30) i (19,12) (33,33) (21,25) (23,100) i 
• 2) HH Info 53 20 19 28~ 120 i 
fOthHHlnro 
(16,44 ) (14,17) (9,16) (11,2 (13,100) • 
56 ! 42 26 43 167 
(17,34) (30,25) (12,16) (17,26) (18,100) 
4) HHJob 7 7 5 21 40 
(2,17) (5,17) i (2,13) (8,53) (4,100) 
5) Oth HHJob i 19 4 14 20 I 57 
-"""--""" 
(6,33) (3,7) (6,25) (8,35) i (6,100) 
6) Going factories 44 15 35 38 132 
i (14,33) (11,11) (16,27) ( 15,29) (14,100) " 
17) Knock on doors 41 11 26 22 100 ! 
(13,41) (8,11 ) (12,26) (9,22) (11,100) i 
i 8) Empt agency 10 4 9 11 34 
(3,29) (3,12) (4,26) (4,32) (4,100) 
9) Prev. Employer 5 2 3 3 13 
(2,38) i (1,15) (1,23) (1,23) (1,100) 
110) Side of road 0 0 1 2 3 
i (0,0) (0,0) (0,33) (1,66) (0,100) 
111) Notice boards I 4 1 1 3 ! 9 
(1,44) (1,11) (0,11) (1,33) i (1,100) 
Other22 18 7 11 11 
i 
47 
(6,38) (5,15) (5,23) (4,23) (5,100) 
• Total 324 139 I 223 257 943 
(100,34) (100,15) (100,24) (100,27) I 
Source: KMP 2000, own calculatIOns, Number (Column%; Row%) 
Table 14 reports the search methods which the currently unemployed perceive to be 
the best way to find a job given their skill level and experience. Non-searchers do not 
show any particular pattern of preference with 41 % of them considering passive 
search methods to be the best way to look for a job. Mixed strategy searchers indicate 
that all methods are appropriate with 44% of them stating that passive search is the 
best way. 
It is surprising that 47% of the exclusive network searchers consider active search 
methods as the best way of looking for a job (non-shaded area of exclusive network 
search column), while 29% of the exclusive active searchers report the use of social 
networks as the most effective way of finding a job (non-shaded area of exclusive 
active search column). This clearly indicates that the choice of the search method is to 
some extent constrained, i.e. the search strategy is a compromise between what is 
perceived to be the best way to look for a job and what is feasible. 
2223 of the "Other" methods refer to participate in training courses, while the rest is a mainly a mixture 











What constrains the searchers from pursuing more active search? 
Table 15. Constraints to Search 
I Search Domestic Health Problems Hunger Total 
! method Duties Yes :"lo Yes :"lo 
Excl. active 0.73 24 201 46 178 225 
( 1.20) (22; II) (24; 89) (24;21) (23; 79) (24,100) 
• Excl passive 1.14 25 116 33 108 141 
( 1.46) (23; 18) (14; 82) (18;23) (14; 77) (15,100) 
Mix Strategy 0.68 20 235 50 205 255 
( 1.18) (18; 8) (28;91) (27; 20) (27; 80) (27,100) i 
Non search 1.10 42 282 58 268 324 
(1.48) (38; 13) (34; 87) (31; 18) (35; 82) (34,100) 
Total/Avg 0.9 ! 111 834 187 759 
I 
945 
(1.35) (100;12) (100; 88) (100; 20) . (100; 80) 
Source: KMP 2000, 0\\" calculations, Number (Column%; Row% or Standard Error) 
Looking at table 15 we can see that the various search methods experience different 
levels of constraints. Exclusive network searchers are mainly tied up in domestic 
duties which seems to give them no time to pursue more active search methods. Non 
searchers, also having on average the highest number of children in the household, are 
also constrained by domestic duties but not as much as exclusive network searchers. 
Exclusive active searchers and mixed strategy searchers are the least constrained 
groups with respect to domestic duties. 
A similar picture emerges when we look at health problems. Again, social network 
searchers are most hampered by health problems with 18% of them reporting that 
health problems have more than occasionally interfered with their ability to look for a 
job. Search groups which pursue more active search methods are less hindered by 
health problems. 
Finally, although proportionally more social network searchers have indicated that 
hunger interfered with their ability to search for a job, all search groups seem to 











Respondents were asked to evaluate a set of conditions by indicating if a change in 
the condition would impact on the search behaviour. Although we cannot conclude 
from the answer to a hypothetical change in a condition that the respondent would 
really behave in such a way, this can give us some insights into the mental state of the 
respondent and the perception of what influences the search behaviour. 
T bl 16 C d" a e : on Itlons Mfi eetmg J b S 0 eare hB h . e aViour 0 f h U t e nemploye d 
Condition Non Search Excl Pass Excl Act Mix Str. 
Search not worth 3.43 3.27 3.44 3.40 
r-!!'0ney of trans~ort . (1.24) (1.33) (1.24) (1.35) 
~ Higb un,mploym,nt, tbus 2.93 2.76 2.71 2.87 
pointless searc~ (1.31) (1.53) ( 1.39) ( 1.42) 
i Employer favour 4.10 4.27 i 4.15 4.26 
I , friends and family of employed ( 1.06) ( 1.03) ( 1.04) (.98) 
I Generally: more jobs more search 4.13 i 4.32 4.10 4.32 
! (.99) (.83 ) (.99) (.93) 
More jobs, more act search 4.29 4.51 4.43 4.49 
(.81) (.65) (.72) (.68) 
i 
More money, more act search 4.13 4.32 4.31 4.41 
(1.05) (.87) (.88) (.77) 
I Family support 2.19 2.22 2.04 2.11 
(1.25) (1.42) (1.20) ( 1.36) 
• Family suffers bec unemployed 3.48 3.51 3.48 3.70 
I ( 1.28) (1.25) (1.27) (1.26) 
Family starves bec unemployed 3.40 3.35 3.39 
I 
3.62 
I (1.28) (1.2~) i (1.33) (1.32) 
Source: KMP 2000, OW11 calculatlOns, ;-';umber (Standard Error) 
Each of these questions was evaluated by the respondent by indicating agreement on a 
scale from one to five. When respondents disagreed strongly the variable takes on the 
value of one, when they agreed strongly the value is five while indifference is 
indicated by the value three. 
Generally all groups seem to be fairly similar in their perception of how certain 
conditions impact on search. Thus, only subtle differences between the search groups 
are detectable. All search groups weakly agree with the statement that search is not 
worth the cost one spends on transport. The most surprising aspect is that exclusive 
network searchers are most indifferent of the unemployed about the cost of transport. 
This might indicate that the choice of relying on social networks is not the outcome of 
financial constraints. 
All unemployed weakly disagree with the statement that high unemployment renders 
search pointless. In this case the non searchers are closest to being indifferent which 
seems to suggest that they experience some degree of discouragement. Exclusive 
active searchers disagree the strongest with this statement. 
There is strong agreement among all unemployed that employers recruit friends and 
family of their existing workforce. Although one would expect that exclusive network 
searchers as well as mixed strategy workers would think so, it is interesting that non-
searchers and exclusive active searchers also agree strongly. This might once again be 
an indication that searchers are constrained in their choice of search methods. As we 











of contacts. With no contacts available, the searcher has to resort to exclusive active 
search or eeases to search. 
All unemployed would search more actively if there were more jobs in the labour 
market. While the searching unemployed are very similar in this regard, the non 
searching unemployed are slightly less forceful in their agreement, which might 
suggest that they are less optimistic of finding a job even if there were more available 
jobs. A similar picture evolves when asked about financial constraints. Everyone 
agrees that they would search more actively if they had more money with the mixed 
strategy searchers being the most forceful group. Non searchers once again agree to a 
lesser degree. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the statement that "it is not so bad to be out of 
work because other people support me". Exclusive active searchers were the most 
forceful group to disagree with the statement followed by the mixed strategy 
searchers. Non searchers and exclusive network searchers also disagreed with the 
statement but not as strongly as the other two groups. As mentioned before this might 
suggest that the last two groups exhibit some level of voluntary unemployment, or in 
other words are not under severe pressure to find employment. This interpretation is 
supported by the remaining two questions. When asked if the family is worse off or 
has to starve because of the respondent being unemployed mixed strategy searchers 
agreed most with the other three groups being fairly even. Thus, the last two points 
might indicate the respondent's access to total household income as well as the 
position of the job-seeker as one of the main bread winners. Hence, it is more urgent 
for the mixed strategy searchers to find employment. 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
We have established in the descriptive analysis certain factors which can be seen as 
facilitators or constraints to the choice of search method. In the following regression 
we want to test the statistical significance of the various factors. The aim is to 
understand why unemployed job-seekers pursue certain search strategies. 
5.2.1 Methodology 
In this case the best way to test variables which determine different outcomes is by 
using a multinominal logit model (MNLM). The advantage of the MNLM is that it 
"simultaneously estimate[es] binary logits for all comparisons among the dependent 
categories"(Long and Freese, 2001: 172). This allows us to compare the different 
search strategies against the independent variables which we established above. Here 
we deal with four different search strategies: non-searchers, exclusive network 
searchers, exclusive active searchers and mixed strategy searchers. The main focus of 
this thesis is to understand why some unemployed rely exclusively on passive search 
methods rather than pursue other search strategies. Thus, we use exclusive network 
searchers as the base category against which we compare other search strategies. 
The main problem of the MNLM is the possibility of including categories which have 











assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IlA) and implies that 
"adding or deleting outcomes does not affect the odds among the remaining 
outcomes"(Long and Freese, 2001: 188). Thus, for example, excluding non-searchers 
from the multinominal logit regression should not alter the odds ratio between 
exclusive network searchers and any of the remaining two search strategies if the IIA 
holds. In order to control for the IlA we perform a Hausman test. 
Furthermore, we have to test for the possibility of combining different outcome 
categories. If the independent variables do not explain the difference between two 
outcomes at a statistically significant level, we can assume that the two outcomes are 
indistinguishable. "If two outcomes are indistinguishable with respect to the variables 
in the model, then you can obtain more efficient estimates by combining them"(Long 
and Freese, 2001: 184). This test is particularly interesting for this thesis as we want 
to examine factors which explain the choice of different search strategies. We can 
expect to see a significant overlap between exclusive network searchers and mixed 
strategy searchers as well as between exclusive active searchers and mixed strategy 
searchers. The Wald test for combining outcomes can show if the distinction we made 
between the different search strategies is justified. 
Finally, we test for the significance of specific variables themselves. Again utilizing a 
Wald test for testing the effects of the independent variables we can identify 
individual variables which explain the choice of the search method. 
5.2.2 Analysis 
We run two regressions. The first one establishes the factors which determine the 
choice of the search method. Motivated by the theoretical discussion as well as the 
descriptive analysis, we include individual and household variables which either 
constrain or facilitate the use of a search method. 
In the second regression we control for variables which we consider to be relevant in 
the determination of the search method and compare the perception of the 
unemployed of various conditions and how these conditions impact on their search 
behaviour. 
As discussed above, in order to control for the independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
we performed the Hausman test of 1lA. The results show that we cannot reject the 
Null hypothesis that IIA holds (See Appendix Table A3). We further examined 
whether some of the dependent categories could be combined into one, i.e. to what 
extent the categories are statistically different from one another. The Null hypothesis 
that 'all coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 
equal (i.e., categories can be collapsed) can be rejected for almost all pairs of 
categories at a 1 % significance level except for one pair. The only pair for which the 
Null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a statistically significant level, is the 
combination of exclusive active searchers and mixed strategy searchers (see Appendix 
Table A4). Despite the suggestion that these two outcomes should be combined, we 











Table 17: MNLR: Exclusive Network Searchers compared to other Search Strate~ies 
C-:::-~ ..... 
i 
I Regression 1 Multinomallogits 
(Base Group: Excl Network Search~rs) ~ Non Search Excl Act Mix Str. 
Male -.6658** .2786 .2246 
(.3013) (.2?71) (.283~) 
Coloured .3995 .4539 -.0272 




I (.0149) (.0158) (.0155) 
I Married 
I 
-.2819 -.1941 -.2314 
(.2921 ) (.3124) I (.3040) 
Education -.0104 .0563 .0788 
(.0472) (.0502) (.0486) 
Domestic Duties -.1857** ~.2758*** ~.2832*** 
(.0909) (.1016) (.0969) 
I Health Problems ~.4666 ~.3357 -.6760t 
(.3957) (.4168) (.4192) 
• Hunger ~.7428** -.2131 I -.1774 
(.3373) (.3413) (.3210) 
I Unemployment .0035 .0010 ~.0008 
: Length (.0028) (.0032) (.0032) 
! Contacts -.9251*** -.7680*** -.2206 
(.2599) (.2713) (.2606) 
Local -1.1603*** -.7009t -.7130* 
(.4372) (.4401 ) (.4230) 
HH Employment -.4814* -.2416 -.4584t 
(.2898) (.3045) (.2909) 
HH Income -.0000 -.0005 -.0003 
per capita (-.0004) (.0004) (.0004) 
! Child size .0568 .0369 .0129 
(.0877) (.0929) (.0905) 
I Adult size .0653 .0013 .0017 
(.10§6) (.1124) (.1082) 
I HH Active .6927t .4773 .6731 t 
l~earch (.4385) (.4540) (.4338) 
i HHNetwork -1.2043*** -1.3292*** -.6204t 
Search (.4295) (.4595) (.3910) 
I HH Mixed -.8587** -.0171 .1433 
I Strategy Search (.4001 ) (.3861 ) ( .3632) f--=---.. 
1.4458* .4414 .3153 
I 
Constant 
(.7941) (.8426) (.8209) 
Observations 649 
LR Chi2 (36) 135.39 
P .'''l 0.0000 
I Pseudo R2 0.0770 
SIgnIficance levels: t between 10% and 15%; * at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1 % level 
A main limitation of the regression estimations has been the loss of a significant 
number of observations. Unfortunately, the high number of lost observations is the 
outcome of the accumulation of missing observations of various variables. Thus, lt is 
not possible to single out one variable and simply exclude the variable to increase the 











The personal characteristics of the individuals do not seem to explain the differences 
between the different search groups. Although some significance might have been lost 
with the low number of observations, the individual's race, age, marital status and the 
number of years of education are not significant in explaining the difference between 
exclusive passive search and other search behaviour. Even a breakdown of different 
educational attainment levels has not shown any significance in any equation. Thus, 
the characteristics of the individuals seem to be fairly unimportant in choosing 
exclusive passive search rather than any other search method. The only individual 
characteristic which has some significance is gender. More females are non-searching 
than exclusively passive searching. 
This rather surprising finding can also be seen in the Wald test for independent 
variables which shows that the Null hypothesis, that all coefficients associated with 
given variables are 0, cannot be rejected for most individual variables (See Appendix 
Table AS). Except for gender all other individual characteristics are not statistically 
significant in explaining the choice of the search strategy. 
The first regression does support the main argument of this thesis. The choice of the 
search method is determined by factors which either constrain or facilitate the pursuit 
of a search method. The most significant constraint on the ability of passive searchers 
to pursue other search methods is the obligation to do domestic duties. Domestic 
duties reduce the likelihood of being an exclusive active searcher or a mixed strategy 
searcher at a 1 % significance level. Even non-searchers seem to be less restricted by 
domestic duties. This can be interpreted as implying that exclusive network searchers 
simply do not have the time to pursue other search methods. The significance of 
domestic duties is not reduced even when we control for household size of children 
and adults. What is rather surprising is how unimportant the children household size 
and the adult household size is for the choice of the search method. 
In terms of health problems exclusive network searchers are more constrained by 
health problems than mixed strategy searchers although this is only weakly 
significant. Health problems do not explain the difference between exclusive passive 
searchers and non-searchers or exclusive active searchers. 
Exclusive passive searchers have experienced hunger as an obstacle to search. This 
contrasts with the non-searchers. Thus, hunger as a constraint to search reduces the 
likelihood of being a non-searcher compared to an exclusive network searcher at a 5% 
significance leveL What is interesting is the fact that hunger as a search constraint is 
not different for all searching unemployed. All searching unemployed have 
experienced hunger as an obstacle for search compared to non-searchers (see 
Appendix Regression A6). This might indicate that non-searchers are in general better 
off than searching unemployed. 
In terms of facilitating passive search the availability of contacts significantly 
explains the difference between passive search and other search methods. Contacts to 
other workers in the labour market increase the likelihood of being an exclusive 
network searcher rather than a non searcher or an exclusive active searcher at a 1 % 
significance level. As expected, contacts do not explain the difference between 
exclusive passive searchers and mixed strategy searchers as both groups use these 











main difference between exclusive active searchers and mixed strategy searchers (see 
Appendix Regression A 7). The Wald test for combining outcomes suggests that the 
two groups are not statistically different except for these contacts. This finding is 
exactly the point of this thesis. The difference between choosing to use social 
networks or pursuing active search is determined by the availability of social contacts. 
When such contacts are available people will use them. 
More household employment decreases the likelihood of being in a different search 
method than passive search. This though is only weakly significant for non searchers 
and mixed strategy searchers while household employment does not explain the 
difference between exclusive network searchers and exclusive active searchers. These 
combinations make the interpretation of the results slightly more difficult. 
Considering that exclusive active and exclusive network searchers have other 
employed members in their household, household employment seems to affect the 
search strategy in different ways. It can on the one hand increase the information flow 
or on the other hand give access to financial resources which again can either finance 
active search or reduce search intensity. The last point is not supported by the 
regression as there is no statistical difference among the search groups with respect to 
household income per capita. Nevertheless, household employment does influence the 
search behaviour of the unemployed. It rather seems that household employment 
gives access to finance in order to pursue active search but when people are time 
constrained because of domestic duties, then households function mainly as 
information transmitters. 
The use of social networks is strongly determined by the embeddedness of the job 
searcher. Being a migrant reduces the likelihood of being an exclusive network 
searcher. Thus, exclusive network searchers seem to be embedded into a locally 
defined social network. Migrants on the other hand have to build these networks first. 
Especially for non-searchers the distinction between being locally born and having 
migrated to Cape Town is highly significant. As was already established, non-
searchers have the lowest number of contacts to the labour market as well as the 
lowest number of household employment. Following Dinkelman and Pirouz, non-
searchers therefore have the weakest degree of attachment to the labour market. Being 
a local also reduces the likelihood of being an exclusive active searcher or a mixed 
strategy searcher although both are only weakly significant. 
Finally, households seem to create some kind of search culture. More exclusive 
passive searchers find themselves in household where other household members also 
rely exclusively on social networks. In terms of active search, exclusive network 
searchers have fewer household members who pursue exclusive active search 
compared with other search groups. Thus, it does not seem that there is a division of 
labour in terms of the search activity where some household members search actively 
and the rest rely on the information which comes back to the household. Rather the 
structure of the household creates conditions which are conducive for the adoption of 
a particular search strategy. Again, one could speculate that the search strategy of the 
household seems to be closely related to the availability of contacts to the labour 
market. 
In summary, we can say that being an exclusive network searcher rather than pursuing 











outcome of constraints and facilitators. Domestic duties in particular restrict the 
passive searcher from spending time on active search. At the same time, because the 
passive searcher is so strongly embedded into a locally defined social network with a 
high level of household employment and local contacts, it is possible for them to rely 
on friends and family to get access to the labour market. 
The second regression establishes a picture of the mental state of the various search 
groups. We control for certain variables which we consider 10 be influential in the 
choice of the search method as well as the mental state of the searcher. We then 
include a variety of conditions which the respondents had to evaluate in terms of the 
effect these conditions might have on their search behaviour. Respondents indicated if 
they disagreed or agreed on a scale from one to five to the conditions and the effects 
these conditions might have on their search behaviour. Because the variables were not 
created as dummy variables, the second regression can only be seen as a preliminary 
analysis of the perception variables. More tests with different classifications of the 
variables would be a more appropriate approach to testing the significance of these 
variables. For this reason we excluded the second regression from the main analysis 
(see results in Appendix Table A 7). 
Nevertheless it is interesting to see that only the perceived availability of jobs and its 
impact on search intensity is different at a statistically significant level. Exclusive 
network searchers agree more forcefully than exclusive active searchers to the 
statement that "if there were more jobs available, more people would look for work". 
The response is not statistically different between exclusive network searchers and 
non-searchers or mixed strategy searchers. Thus, all three groups seem to have the 
same perception of the availability of jobs. It is therefore remarkable that exclusive 
network searchers would respond most positively to an increase in available jobs by 
increasing their search intensity. They agreed the strongest compared to all other 
search groups with the statement that "if there were more jobs to be had, I would 
search for employment more actively". This is not too surprising given the fact that 
they do not search actively at all. Nevertheless, it indicates that exclusive network 
searchers perceive themselves to be constrained by the lack of available jobs and thus 












The aim of the thesis was twofold. Firstly, we have tried to develop a theoretical 
framework which allowed us to account for the various factors which influence the 
job search process. Secondly, using the 2000 KhayelitshalMitchell's Plain Survey we 
investigated factors which either constrain or facilitate the pursuit of certain search 
strategies. 
The literature review on the South African debate around the most appropriate 
definition of unemployment has argued that search activity in the South African 
context is determined by constraints. Mass unemployment forces the unemployed to 
carefully consider the benefits and the costs of search. A low probability of finding a 
job and high search costs have led to a spatial division of search with low search 
activity in remote rural areas and higher search activity in urban areas. The main 
problem of search is the unequal access to information. Various factors have been 
identified to constrain or facilitate access to labour market information. The use of 
social networks is seen as a response to the adverse conditions ofthe labour market. 
Out of these findings we developed a more formal search model which accounts for 
the various aspects which can influence search activity. We argue that the decision to 
engage in search and the choice of the search method is determined by four aspects: 
the probability of locating a job, the probability of getting a job, the financial cost of 
the search method and the time spent pursuing the search method. Various search 
methods create different degrees of access to the labour market in terms of providing 
information and their ability to transmit information between the employer and the 
job-seeker. At the same time each search method generates different amounts of 
financial and opportunity costs. The choice of the search method is therefore the 
compromise between what the searcher perceives to be the most effective search 
strategy and what is feasible for the searcher. Individual, household and labour market 
characteristics will either facilitate or constrain the pursuit of certain search strategies. 
Because of the importance of social networks in the South African labour market, we 
established factors which constrain or facilitate the use of social networks. We argued 
that the usefulness of social networks depends on the overlap of supply networks 
through which job-seekers look for a job and recruitment networks through which 
employers use their existing workforce to source new labourers. The position of the 
job-seeker within the network structures in terms of proximity to the recruitment 
network is crucial. The closer the job-seeker is to the recruitment network the higher 
is the probability that the job-seeker will locate a job and get a job. In terms of search 
costs, social networks generate the least financial burden on the household while it 
still allows the job-seeker to pursue other non-market activities. 
The KhayelitshalMitchell's Plain Survey of 2000 allows us to analyse factors which 
influence the search process. The main findings of the analysis support the argument 
of this thesis that the choice of the search method is the outcome of constraints and 
conditions which facilitate the use of the search method. Especially exclusive strategy 
searchers indicated that they perceive other search strategies as more effective but 
they seem to be constrained in pursuing these. For exclusive active searchers the main 











for exclusive network searchers the constraint to pursue active methods is the lack of 
time. Exclusive passive searchers are time constrained because they have to perform 
domestic duties. 
The central theme of this thesis has been the argument that the proximity of the job 
searcher to the recruitment network is crucial. The findings show that the choice of 
the search method is strongly influenced by the availability of contacts with the labour 
market. Thus, when contacts are available they will be utilized to get access to the 
labour market. The main reason that exclusive active searchers use only active search 
methods is the lack of contacts. However, because they are not bound to the 
household they can pursue active search methods. As the availability of contacts 
increases so does the use of social networks. Mixed strategy searchers are very similar 
to exclusive active searchers except for the fact that they reported to have more 
contacts in the labour market. Immediately we see that the search strategy includes 
passive search methods. Exclusive network searchers are the best connected group in 
the labour market. Their reliance on social networks to find employment is justified 
by the fact that they are closest to a locally defined recruitment network. That they are 
not pursuing active channels might be the outcome of not having time because of 
domestic duties. It could also be the case that their position within the social networks 
gives them the time to concentrate on domestic duties. Thus domestic duties could be 
the outcome facilitated by social networks rather than being the constraint to active 
job search. 
It is surprising how little explanatory power the personal characteristics of the 
individuals seem to have in explaining the choice of the search method. Clearly the 
loss of observations might have impacted on this finding; nevertheless the only 
significant individual characteristic is gender in determining the difference between 
the searching unemployed and the non-searching unemployed. This again confirms 
that females, and especially female migrants, are the most marginalised group of 
unemployed in the labour market. Their position is exacerbated by the fact that they 
have very few contacts in the labour market. Thus, the decision not to engage in 
search seems to be the outcome of a very low probability of finding a job. 
Finally, mixed strategy searchers seem to be the least constrained group of searchers 
and, as the currently employed have shown, mixed strategy searchers are the most 
likely group to find employment. This though can only be analysed properly when the 
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Table AI: Len th of Current Unemployment in M=on=-t=h:::s_-r-~. __ ""'---_.~ __ r___ ---' 
Search 0 6 7 - 12 1 - 2 / 2 - 4 
method ... 1 months.. months Years, Years 
Excl. actiw;-r 45 1 45 42 45 
I • (28; 2o)-----+-26; 20) (23; 18)_1-1 ---.l:(2:::.::5.'-'; 2::..;:01....) _--':'~-'-'L--!---':'=:::':"'''''. 
4-8 8+ Total 
Years 
27 230 
(19; II) (25; II) i----J 
19 13 , 140 ; l! .. Xcl passive . I 20 I .. 30 30 / 28 
.1 (12; 15) I 07; 21) (17~\---'.(~16::...; :::.:20;!..) __ ~~'---I--~~'--~_ 
/ 
Mix Strategy 48 I 48 52 44 
(15; 14) I I 
39 247 I 
r-____ +~(:::.:.30:..:..;.:_19;.J..)~1~19) 25; 18) 
Non search 48' 53 62 
(31; 16) (15; 6) 
39 50 
/--____ +-~(3.-'..cO;'-.1-,-6 ),---,---,QO; 17) (48; 16) 
105 
I Tota_1 __ ~J..--,(",-l 0:...:;1  .... ; ~:..,.7"-) -J...-::-:-,(::..;.1 ;~ ~ 9) ... ~.L-~=-C::~_"-_C:' .. ::"':":-'-'-'_L-...:c:...:c:..c.=~.J....­ (100; II) 
Source: KMP 2000, 0\\11 calculations, ~umber (Column%, Row''Io) 
Table A2: Marital Status of Currently Unem~}L'e=-:d:z,-,--___ ,-
I 
1 Non Search " Excl Pass ~d Act I Mix Str. 1 Tot;II 
Never Married [ 174 • 84 i 136 /' 164 I 558 I 
I i (53; 31) I: (60; 15) I (61;24) ,(66;29) (59,100) 1 
rMarried I 82 26 ! 42 45 195: 
I'" (25;42), (19; 13) 1(19;22)1 (18;23) (21,100) I' 
Ir-M-a-rr-ie-d-(-tr-a-d-.)~··--r1-3-2~· : 17 I 23 T25 : 97 
~ , (10 ,~) (12 18) (10 24) I (10 26) '( 0100) I , - , , 
I~L¥J~ , Living "~ith Partner I i 6 7 7 I b; 19) ~ 1(5;43) (5; 19) (3; 19) 
, widow 112 2 8 13 : 25 




' 7 3 14 4 I 18 i 
_--,-1_(2_; 3_9_} , __ --iI~(~2.;-1-7) __ rl (4-2-; 2_2_) _:..../ ~(2.; 22}_-i:~2:.::., 1c:;.0:::..,0)'----I 
/
' 6 [I . 1 2 13 
(2;46) : (1;8) 1 (2;31) (1; 15) illlOO) 
------c1-3-29~ : 140 -~:r-2:""2-4~----i'-2-5-0--··· .. ~ 
1 (100; 35) I (100; 15) I (100; 24) ,(100; 27) /943 ~ 
Source: KMP 2000, own calculations. Number (Column %, Row!!) 
Table A3: Hausman Test for IIA 
1 Omitted 1 chi2 df ··p>chli evidence 
1 
l 0 I -2.804 36 l.000 forHo 
12 1 4.501 36 1.000 forHo 
l3_ 1 -2.347 37 1.000 forHo .-
[I I 2.663 36 1 ,OOO=--__ -..o...:£:.::,;o;..r =Ho 














Table A4: Wald Test of Possibility of Combin~ Outcomes 
• Categories tested chi2 • df I P>chi2 
! I 
• 0- q 36.584 18 • 0.006 
I 0- t 61.267 18 10.000 
· 0- 1 54.343 18 ! 0.000 
2- 3 16.473 18 10.560 
2- 1 32.801 18 I 0.018 
3- 1 32.285 18 10.02 
Source KMP 2000, OV"'Tl calculattons 
Table AS: Wald Test for lode endent Variables 
chi2 df P>chi2 












T hi A6 MNLMR f Ct' t dF Tt t fS h St t . a e " . e2reSSIOns 0 ons ram san aC11 a ors 0 earc ... ra egles 
I Multinomal Regression A6 Regression A 7 
: logits (Base Group: Non-Searchers) (Base Group: Excl Act Searcher~ 
I Male .. Excl Network : Excl Active ,Mix Strategy Non Search Excl Network Mix Strategy , 
.6658** .9444*** .8905*** -.9444*** /-.2786 1-.0539 
(.3013) (.2588) (.2499) (.2588 ) : (.2971) :(.2453) 
i Coloured -.3995 i .0543 -.4267 -.0543 i -.4539 -.4811 , 
(A650) (3993) • (A053) (3993) (4763) i (.4147) i 
Age -.0215t 1-·0050 -.0021 .0050 • -.0165 i -.0029 
(.0149) : (.0121) (.0120) (.0121 ) i (.0158) 1(.0128) i 
Married .2819 .0877 · .0504 -.0877 ' .1941 i .0372 
i (.2921 ) (,2548) i (.2501) (.2548) , (.3124) : (.2703) 
Education .0104 : .0668 1.0892** -.0668 -.0563 .0224 I 
(.0472) (.0417) • (.0406) (.04] 7) (,0502) (.0434) 
: Domestic Duties .1857** -.0901 -.0975 .0901 .2758*** -.0073 
i (.0909) (.0891 ) (.0862) (,0891 ) (.1016) (.0971 ) i I Health Problems .4666 ! .1308 • -.2094 -.1308 • .3357 -.3402 i (.3957) i (.3659) (.3814) (.3659) (.4168) (.3989) 
t~ 
.7428** ' .5296* .5653* -.5296* .2131 -.0357 I 
(.3373) i (.3069) (.2926) , (3069) (.3413) (.2909) 
: Unemployment -.0035 1-.0025 ! -.0044 .0025 -.0010 -.0019 
i Lenglh (.0028) (.0024) i (.0025) (.0024) (.0032) (.0028) i 
I Contacts .9251 *** i .1571 .7044*** -.1571 .7680*** .5473** 
(.2599) , (.2292) (.2185) (.2292) (.2713) (.2281 ) 
i Local 1.1603*** .4593 : .4473 -.4593 .7009t -.0120 
(.4372) (.3935) (.3902) , (.3935) (A401) (.3899) 
: HH employment .4814* : .2398 .0230 -.2398 .2416 -.2168 
i (.2898) (.2571) (.2473 ) (.257\ ) (.3045) (.2602) 
,HH income per .0000 -.0004 -.0002 1.0004 .0005 i .0001 
~cap , (-.0004) (.0004) (,0004) • (.0004) , (.0004) : (.0004) 
, Child size -.0568 -.0199 -.0438 1.0199 -.0369 1-.0239 
(.0877) (.0763) (.0751 ) i (.0763) (.0929) ! (.0793) 
Adult size ! -.0653 .0640 -.0636 • -.0640 -.0013 1.0003 ·(.1086) . (.0970) i (.0941) (.0970) (.1124) (.0966) 
• HH Active -.6927t -.2153 1-0555 . .2153 -.4773 i .1598 
Search (A385) (.3320) (.3165) (.3320) (.4540) • (.3316) 
HH Network 1.2043*** -.1249 .5839t .. 1249 1.3292*** .7088* 
. Search (.4295) (.4642) (.4002) (A642) (A595) (A271) 
HH Mixed .8581** .84] 6** 1.0021 *** -.8416** .0171 •. 1604 
Strategy Search (.4001) (.3530) (.3332) (.3530) (.3861 ) (.3125) i 
Constant -1.4458* -1.0043 -1.1304 ·1.0043 · -.4414 -.1261 
i 
: 
(.6791 ) i (.6668) (.6791) i (.8426) (.7941 ) (.7145) 
Observations 649 649 
: LR Chi2 (36) 135.39 135.39 
: Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
I Pseudo R2 0.0770 0.0770 
















(Base Group: Excl Network Searchers) 
Non Search Excl Act 
-.7475** .0584 
• Mix Str. 
I---~----:-___ --+-__ (.2975) (.2966) 











! HH employment 


















-.9082*** -.6884** -.1730 
(.2617) (.2763) (.2655) 
-.8636** -.4672 -.6078t 
(.4256) (.4332) (.4222) 
-.3483 -.3869 -.5987** 
(.2671) (.2837) (.2713) 
-.0002 -.0004 -.0001 
(.0003) (.0004) (.0003) 
Search Not .0801 .0919 .0081 
! 
r.W __ ort_h_M __ on_e~Y __ ~r-----(~.0-9-90~)------r---~(.-10-5_S) __ ---r----~(.0_9_8_5)~ __ ~ 
High unemployment .1096 .0068 .0908 
I (.0964) (.102S) (.0966) 
• Generally: -.1454 -.3252** -.0512 











• More money -.0806 -.0657 .1558 
r--M __ o-r-,.,e-se-a-rc-h----~------('-.1-5-90-').--___j-----'-(.'-=-1-'-70::..:5..L)-_-+-__ --'-(.'_=_1_'_76::..:1:.-'..) ___ , 
Family support -.0256 -.0775 -.0288 
(.100S) (.1091) (.1020) 
Family worse -.0346 .0106 .0821 
(.1712) (.1800) (.1764) 
Family starves .1086 .0797 .1651 
r-_____ -t-__ -'-(_.1_71--'7). __ -+ __ ~(."__=18=_:c1_'"'4 )'--_-'-__ ..L(.1=-7.."-61:.L) __ -1 
Constant 4.4859*** 3.9385*** 1.5469 
~_----:-___ +-_~(_1._26_7~9) ___ ~_~(1_.3_4_12~) ____ ~1 ___ ~(_1._31_3~7)~_~ 
Observations ... 647 
• LR Chi2 (36) 124.21 
• Prob>chi2 0.0000 
I Pseudo R2 ---:--:--'-----:-____ -:-c-:-:-:--:---:----:-:-:--:---:-O.0711 
SIgnIficance levels: t between 10% and 15%; * at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level and *** at the I % level 
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